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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been widespread publicity concerning the decline in produc­
tivity, saving, and investment in the United States. Some of the media’s attention has 
focused on the decline relative to other industrialized nations, while other coverage has 
emphasized the decline from past U .S. rates. M any economists, government officials, and 
others have expounded reasons for the declining rates, including the influence of govern­
ment policies.
This report is premised on the assumption that increasing saving and investment is 
desirable. Within the range of government policies influencing productivity and saving, 
the tax system is pervasive. It has proven an efficient means of providing economic incen­
tives and, hence, can be used either to encourage or discourage saving and investment. 
Thus, the report addresses those tax alternatives that encourage relatively more saving and 
relatively less consumption (in the business context, the parallel concept would be the 
encouragement of capital formation).
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is well-acquainted with tax 
laws; hence, the thrust of this study document is to analyze potential changes in those laws. 
However, tax laws are not the sole, or perhaps the best, vehicle for influencing saving and 
investment. M any economists advocate that a better method would be to reduce govern­
ment deficits or expenditures or both, while others defend the use of monetary policy. Still 
others propose changing government regulations and moderating inflation. While all these 
views are worthy of discussion, the scope of this study document is limited to potential 
changes in tax laws.
The report examines potential changes to our tax system in three broad areas. First, it 
investigates a more comprehensive income base that would permit significantly lower 
rates. This area encompasses a number of current congressional bills as well as the Novem­
ber, 1984 Treasury Department simplification proposals. Next, the report examines the 
taxation of consumption rather than income (also the subject of several current proposals). 
Finally, it addresses changes that can be made to the current income tax system to 
encourage saving relative to consumption. Although each of the alternatives affects saving 
and capital formation in different ways, no policy stance or recommendation is made with 
respect to any of them. As a study document, this report is intended to inform AICPA mem­
bers and others of issues and alternatives relating to the subjects within its scope, but it is 
not designed to set forth any policy position of the AICPA or its Federal Tax Division.
This study draws upon numerous sources for suggestions and analysis; two of the most 
important are Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, the classic reference in the area of tax 
reform, which was published by the Department of the Treasury in 1977, and the 1984 
Treasury Report on Tax Simplification and Reform.1 Both Blueprints and the Treasury 
proposals contain substantial contributions to knowledge on the subject of tax reform; 
they, as well as the other materials in the bibliography, should be studied carefully by the 
serious and interested reader.
1
It should be noted throughout that reference to the “ Treasury proposals” is to those of 
November 1984. While the 1985 Administration proposals vary, this document has used 
April 30, 1985, as a cutoff point for any proposals. Consideration of later material would not 
add materially to knowledge of the issues involved and would delay release of the study 
unduly.
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Chapter 1
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The claim that Americans save too little has become the topic of much debate in recent 
years. Those who make the claim cite two reasons for believing that the saving rate is too 
low. They compare the U .S. rate with those of other industrialized countries; usually, the 
U.S. rate is near the bottom of the lists. They also compare the U .S. rate with prior U.S. 
rates and report a declining trend. The tables below illustrate these claims.
Table 1
Net Household Saving as a Percentage of Disposable Household Income, 
1960-1982
U.S. Canada United Kingdom West Germany Japan
1960-67 8.0 5.7 5.6 16.4 17.0
1968-73 9.2 6.9 5.5 14.7 18.2
1974-79 8.8 10.6 8.1 13.3 21.4
1980 8.0 12.6 11.1 12.8 19.2
1981 8.5 14.1 8.7 13.6 19.7
1982 7.7 15.5 7.1 13.0 17.7
Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Economic Outlook. 
Historical Statistics 1960-1982.
Table 2
U.S. Personal Saving (National Income Account Basis) as a 
Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, 1961-1984
1961-65 6.3
1966-70 7.3
1971-75 8.1
1976-80 6.1
1981 6.7
1982 6.2
1983 5.0
1984 6.1
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current 
Business (Washington, D.C.: USDC, 1985)
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Opponents of this argument attack the definition of saving used in tables such as table 2. 
In general, saving refers to the flow of income and production into uses other than current 
consumption; however, the statistics used in these two tables do not measure all of the con­
sumption deferred or capital accumulated. In the National Income Account (NIA) statis­
tics, saving is a residual —  equal to disposable income, less current personal outlays for 
goods, services (including the estimated value of housing services), interest, and transfers 
to foreigners. The NIA concept of personal saving does not include durable consumer 
goods, which permit consumption in the future, or the changes in market value of existing 
assets. Thus, the NIA statistics understate the amount of consumption deferred.
Another definition of savings that includes accumulation of durable goods is the flow-of- 
funds basis, used by the Federal Reserve. Flow-of-funds household saving is equal to the 
increase in household stocks of durable goods, nonfarm homes, and noncorporate assets, 
less depreciation of those assets, plus net investment in financial assets, less increases in 
household debt. Personal saving on a flow-of-funds basis equals flow-of-funds household 
saving, less government insurance and pension reserve, net investment in consumer durables, 
capital gains dividends from mutual funds, and net saving by farm corps. Using the flow- 
of-funds basis, the U .S. saving rate becomes nearly a quarter higher than the rate provided 
in NIA statistics (see table 3).
Table 3
Household Saving, Personal Saving, and Personal Saving as a Percentage 
of Disposable Personal Income (Flow-of-Funds Basis). 
1960-1984 (In Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates)
Household Saving Personal Saving Percentage of Disposable Income
1960 36.7 26.2 7.4
1965 65.0 39.1 8.2
1970 86.4 56.7 8.6
1975 153.0 111.1 10.1
1980 234.7 165.3 9.0
1981 273.9 192.0 9.4
1982 296.3 209.7  9.6
1983 300.3 175.8 7.5
1984 354.0 204.6 7.9
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Summary Statistics 
(Washington, D.C.:FRS, 1985)
The unanswered question is why the U .S. saving rate is so low. M any economists blame 
the low rate on government policies, which they believe generate a fear of saving or a disin­
centive for saving. Some of the major policies are incorporated in tax laws. The social 
security system is another possible saving disincentive, as are other government retirement 
programs, which make saving seemingly unnecessary. Credit market rules, which have 
encouraged extensive borrowing and limited returns to small savers, have also been blamed 
for discouraging saving. Finally, economists cite government deficits and monetary policy 
as causes of a low saving rate.
Present tax laws affect personal saving in a number of ways. First, the deductibility of 
interest expense is an incentive for borrowing. Individuals borrow for two reasons —  saving 
(investment) and consumption. Borrowing for saving has no effect on overall saving rates; 
that is, it is neutral toward savings. However, borrowing for consumption removes funds
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that can otherwise be used for saving or investment and is, therefore, anti-savings. The 
overall effect of the two types of borrowing then is anti-savings. The deduction of interest 
expense certainly provides a large disincentive for creating new saving, since income from 
saving is taxed and expenses of borrowing (dissaving) are deductible. Interestingly, what 
limits already exist in the tax code on deductibility of interest expense (sections 163(d), 
265) restrict interest on investment borrowing but not on that for consumption. Thus, 
unpopular as it would be to many taxpayers, eliminating the consumer-loan-interest 
deduction would serve to increase saving relative to consumption.
A second area of the tax laws that discourages saving is the double (or more) taxation of 
savings: “ first, when earned as income; and second, as the income from the investment that 
the saving generates comes in.” 2 Savings may also be taxed a third time, from capital gains 
on the sale of assets purchased with savings (even if those gains are solely from inflation). 
David Raboy has summed this up in his testimony before a Senate subcommittee: “ As a 
result, the tax system penalizes savings at both ends, it subsidizes those who dissave while 
taxing those who do save.” 3
A  third potential disincentive to saving and investment is double taxation of corporate 
dividends, once when earned by the corporation and once when paid to shareholders. The 
Blueprints study has addressed this problem, and concluded that current tax rules have 
the effect of discouraging investment.
The separate taxation of income earned in corporations is responsible for a number of serious 
economic distortions. It raises the overall rate of taxation on earnings from capital and so pro­
duces a bias against saving and investment. It inhibits the flow of saving to corporate equities 
relative to other forms of investment.4
The study notes that integration of corporate and individual taxes should serve to aid the 
problem of misallocation of resources created by double taxation and, hence, enhance 
investment. Integration could also aid in increasing personal saving by eliminating the 
double taxation of corporate dividends.
There are several alternatives that can alleviate the economic distortions caused by cor­
porate taxation. One such approach would treat all corporations as partnerships and allo­
cate corporate income to shareholders. This approach is theoretically ideal, but suffers 
from enormous record-keeping difficulties. Another would be to repeal the corporate tax 
altogether, which would carry major transition, equity, and political problems. Other 
alternatives include expanding the dividends-received exclusion and implementing a 
dividends-received credit. Such alternatives would not resolve the economic distortions, as 
corporations would still favor debt over equity.
Two alternatives that have received attention in prior years are the dividends-paid 
deduction and the “ gross-up method.”  The dividends-paid deduction approach would 
allow a tax deduction to corporations for dividends distributed to shareholders and would 
thereby remove the disparities between debt and equity financing. (In limited form, this is 
the approach of the 1984 Treasury proposals.)5 A  problem with the deduction, however, is 
that it encourages distributions of earnings and, as such, may impede growth. Further­
more, the corporate tax would still exist for undistributed earnings and, as it does currently, 
may impede saving and investment to some extent.
Under the gross-up method, the shareholder includes in income dividends received and 
the corporate tax attributable to such dividends (gross-up). The shareholder is then 
allowed a tax credit for the amount of the gross-up. Under this method dividends would be 
more attractive to the investor than interest, and, hence, might enhance investment. 
Either of these methods, then, may serve to stimulate investment.
The availability of funds for capital formation may also be reduced by the interest 
expense deduction. Businesses certainly have an incentive to borrow for investment pur­
poses. They receive the deduction for interest as well as the deduction for depreciation and 
the investment tax credit if the funds are used to purchase applicable property. However,
5
individual taxpayers often favor housing and durable goods as investments over financial 
assets such as stocks and bonds. Taxpayers make such choices because borrowing for their 
purchases generates a tax deduction, and the flow of services from housing and durable 
goods is not taxed. It is not clear what the magnitude of the effect on investment is or to 
what extent investment would increase were the deduction removed. However, relative to a 
tax system with no personal-interest-expense deduction, the current system provides dis­
incentives for investment.
The potential results of low saving and investment are the basis for the underlying 
assumption of this report that higher saving and investment are desirable. Martin Feldstein, 
former chairman of President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, has noted
Increasing the rate of capital accumulation must remain one of the central and continuing 
long-run goals of economic policy. A higher rate of capital formation is the most dependable
way to increase productivity and to raise our nation’s rate of economic growth___Our low rate
of capital formation means tha t we as a nation are passing up the opportunity to earn a high 
rate of return and to raise our future standard of living.6
And, former Treasury Secretary W illiam E. Simon writes the following:
Our treatm ent of individual savings and investment income is in sharp contrast to the pref­
erential tax treatm ent of such incomes in most other industrialized countries. [And] although 
our treatm ent of corporate capital income is especially severe, the tax code includes numerous 
tax breaks to specific kinds of capital income that service to misallocate our limited invest­
m ent resources. . . . All of this is done for the purpose of meeting specific social objectives that
might otherwise be neglected. There is, however, little hard evidence to show th a t such con­
cessions are successful in meeting their goals or tha t the benefits tha t follow exceed the costs 
associated with the misallocation of our scarce capital resources.7
These are profound implications, indeed —  the United States has typically been a world 
leader in developing new technologies, increasing output and living standards, and the 
like; declining investment is already showing signs of diminishing that position. Hence, it 
is important to look to alternatives for improving saving and investment in the United 
States —  and, it is hoped, thereby improving capital formation and productivity. Our tax 
system can play an important role in this process, and it is to that end that the following dis­
cussion is aimed.
6
Chapter 2
ALTERNATIVE TAX SYSTEMS
As a starting point for focusing on use of the tax system to encourage saving relative to 
consumption, the chart on the next page illustrates possible primary tax systems. This sec­
tion contains a brief discussion of each alternative and reasons for excluding or including 
the alternative in the report.
When considering an alternative tax system or proposing changes to the present one, 
several issues require attention. The first is whether the base should be income or non­
income —  where a non-income base may be measured by expenditures, value, or receipts. 
The second issue, once a base has been chosen, is its breadth —  from very narrow to com­
prehensive. The present U .S. system lies somewhere between the extremes, as do most cur­
rent proposals.
A  third issue is the rate structure to be coupled with the base. The structure can range 
from nonprogressive (either regressive or “ flat” ) to steeply progressive. When transac­
tional taxes are considered, the choice is between a single rate or a multi-rate structure. 
Finally, the timing of taxation must be considered. The current U.S. system taxes on a 
periodic basis, whereas some systems tax by transaction or on a cumulative basis. Each of 
the tax systems reflected in the chart is briefly described in the following paragraphs, 
referenced to its corresponding number.
Chart References and Discussion of Alternative Tax Systems
(1) The noncomprehensive-base, progressive-rate tax system defines the current U.S. 
income tax. Our system already includes some incentives for saving, such as Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), nontaxation of life insurance cash-surrender value, limited 
dividend exclusion, and so on. The system also includes some major saving disincentives, 
discussed in the introduction to this report.
(2) Maintaining a noncomprehensive base and instituting a nonprogressive rate struc­
ture would most likely have the effect of redistributing the tax burden from high-bracket to 
low-bracket taxpayers and are unlikely to improve upon the current system. Although such a 
structure would probably increase saving and investment, the redistribution of the tax burden 
makes this politically infeasible; therefore, this alternative is not considered further.
(3) The 1984 Treasury proposals and the 1985 Bradley-Gephardt bill (S. 409, H.R. 800 
(99th Cong.)) are examples of a comprehensive, somewhat progressive income tax system 
wherein individuals are subject to a three-tiered rate structure on a base that is broadened 
through the elimination of many special provisions. This type of tax system will be dis­
cussed in chapter 3. Note also that a comprehensive base and progressive rate structure can 
be used with an expenditure base, as in the Hall-Rabushka proposal (see chapter 4).
(4) Examples of the comprehensive, nonprogressive income tax system are represented 
by Senator Helms’s bill (S. 2200 (97th Cong.)) and the Siliander-Nickles “ Flat 10” bill 
(H.R. 200 (99th Cong.)) and, for individuals at least, the 1985 Kem p-Kasten bill (S. 325, 
H.R. 777 (99th Cong.)), all of which impose tax at a single rate.8 (Because such systems
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Primary Tax Systems
Base Type Timing Extent of Base Rate Structure
Income =  Periodic
Transactional
Non-income
Noncomprehensive  
Comprehensive 
Value-added
Retail Sales Tax 
Period ic Expenditure
Cumulative Accessions
Sales
Production 
Comprehensive- 
Noncomprehensive 
Comprehensive-
Noncomprehensive
(1) Progressive
(2) Nonprogressive
(3) Progressive
(4) Nonprogressive
(5) Single-rate
(6) Multi-rate
(7) Single-rate
(8) Multi-rate
(9) Single-rate
(10) Multi-rate
(11) Progressive
(12) Nonprogressive
(13) Progressive
(14) Nonprogressive
(15) Progressive
(16) Nonprogressive
(17) Progressive
(18) Nonprogressive
=  Current
have the potential to create savings incentives, they will be discussed in chapter 3.) The 
principal distinction between the progressive and nonprogressive systems of (3) and (4) on 
the chart (that is, progressivity) involves the issue of “ vertical equity” in the parlance of tax 
policymakers, known better to laymen as “ ability to pay.”
(5)—(10) A  value-added tax (VAT) is a transactional consumption tax, levied on each firm 
in the production and distribution chain, from the acquisition of raw materials through the 
final sale to a customer. In concept, the tax is applied only to the value added by the com­
pany, that is, to the excess of its sales over its purchases of goods or services from other busi­
ness firms. A  sales tax is simply a single-stage VAT applied at the retail level only, and 
many of the advantages and disadvantages claimed for a VAT apply equally to a sales tax. 
(Transactional consumption taxes are discussed in chapter 5.)
(11)-(14) A  periodic-expenditure tax system taxes consumption, which can be thought of 
as income less savings (or plus negative savings). Because income is the starting point for 
defining consumption, the issue of comprehensiveness versus noncomprehensiveness is 
basically the same as it was for an income tax. Major differences between expenditure and 
income taxes are in the treatment of items that go into the concept of saving or dissaving, 
since the periodic-consumption tax base allows a deduction for net savings. The noncom­
prehensive structure, which would allow the exclusion of “ necessary”  expenditures, may 
be more feasible politically. The rate structure issue is, again, the same as for an income tax 
system, wherein the considerations are mainly of vertical equity. (Periodic taxes on con­
sumption are analyzed in chapter 4.)
(15)-(18) An accessions tax is imposed on all incoming cash flows that are not taxed by an 
income tax, if one exists, or all cash flows, if no income tax system is present. As such, the 
tax appears to be neutral regarding saving versus consumption; that is, cash flows are taxed 
as the taxpayer “ accedes”  to them, and beyond that point the taxpayer has no tax incentive 
either to save or consume. Savers and consumers who receive the same cash flows are 
treated equally by the system. Because this report addresses only those tax systems that 
encourage saving relative to consumption, no separate discussion concerning the accessions 
tax is considered necessary.
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Chapter 3
COMPREHENSIVE-INCOME TAX
The term comprehensive-income tax has been used to mean everything from a flat-rate, 
nearly comprehensive system to a progressive rate, semi-comprehensive system. The mod­
ifier comprehensive accurately refers only to the extent of the taxable base, although many 
have used it to refer to a certain rate structure as well.
Proponents of the comprehensive income tax argue that people would save more because 
marginal rates would be lower.9 Some, however, suggest that the opposite may occur. 
Because rates would be lower, taxes would take a smaller portion of savings than they 
currently do, so that one would need to save less to maintain a certain level of after-tax 
savings. 10
The notion of making the taxable base more comprehensive through “ broadening” is far 
from unknown to tax reformers. For example, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
of 1982 and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 are primarily base-broadening efforts with 
few changes in tax rates. The first part of this section discusses the characteristics of a com­
prehensive base. The second part discusses tax base broadening combined with rate revi­
sion —  the effects of a flat-rate tax versus a moderately progressive schedule. Throughout 
this chapter, reference is made to the 1984 Treasury proposals and other legislative pro­
posals where appropriate.
Comprehensive Base
Arnold C. Harberger made the following point in an address to the American Council for 
Capital Formation:
Theoretically . . . [the comprehensive] income tax would tax individuals . . .  on all income, 
whatever the source, including wages and salaries, in-kind compensation, and the real increase in 
the net worth of all investments.11
A comprehensive base system would essentially do away with most current deductions and 
credits. Only a basic sustenance level of income would go untaxed through the retention of 
personal and dependency exemptions. Most economic inflows provide, directly or indirectly, 
the means for a taxpayer to consume or save and would be included in the taxable base. The 
tax base would include such partially excluded items as capital gains, as well as transfer 
payments from the government, such as unemployment insurance, social security, sup­
plementary unemployment income, and the like. Capital gains would be indexed to reflect 
the impact of inflation, as would deductions for depreciation. A  comprehensive base would 
tax more in-kind income than the current base, but the difficulty and complexity of im put­
ing the appropriate monetary value to items such as the imputed rental value of homeow­
ner’s capital investments may make full taxation infeasible.12
The advantages of a comprehensive base are the following: (1) the tax rates needed to 
raise a given amount of revenue can be lower because the more income is subject to tax; (2) 
economic efficiency is increased by removing distortions caused by tax preferences; (3)
9
complexity is reduced by eliminating the multitude of deductions and credits; and (4) fair­
ness is increased by putting the same burdens on taxpayers in similar economic cir­
cumstances. The Treasury proposal notes the following:
A comprehensive definition of taxable income or consumption is generally conducive to sim­
plicity and to equal treatm ent of equally situated taxpayers, while retreat from a comprehen­
sive base generally involves complexity and horizontal inequity. A comprehensive tax base is 
also necessary for economic neutrality, since high tax rates and discrimination between 
various ways of earning and spending income distort economic decisions. 13
A  truly comprehensive base can go far in removing political and social factors from the 
federal tax system, merely from the repeal of many preferences included in our present sys­
tem that give incentives to particular social or economic behavior. While this may prove a 
major benefit of a comprehensive base, it would always be subject to the self-discipline of 
future Congresses.
Lower Tax Rates
Because a comprehensive base is broader, rates may be lowered, and the system will still 
produce the same revenues. For instance, if adjusted gross income is used as a base (on 1984 
projected figures), but with capital gains fully included, a flat rate of 11.8 percent would 
raise the same amount of revenues as the current system. E  taxable income (less zero bracket 
amount) is used, a flat rate of 18.5 percent would be sufficient.14 Note that the latter example 
is not one of base broadening, but merely the result of a shift to a flat-rate structure. One can 
contrast these figures to the top marginal rate of 50 percent in the current system.
Efficiency
The current system of tax preferences for various favored types of income and expenditures 
produces economic distortions in two ways. First, if the income from some particular 
economic activity is either excused from taxation, or taxed at some preferential rate, then 
the activity is more attractive to taxpayers. Resources tend to flow into the tax-preferred 
activity from other activities with higher pretax returns, with the result —  as viewed by 
some —  that the real value of the economy’s output is reduced. 15
This line of reasoning implies a second efficiency cost when these exceptions to the tax 
base begin to multiply and grow. As tax-preferred income increases as a share of the total, 
and fully taxed income therefore shrinks, the tax rates needed to meet the government’s 
revenue needs rise. Thus, the after-tax reward for all non-tax-preferred activities, which 
generally includes work and much of saving, falls. 16
The proponents of a comprehensive base maintain that the solution to these problems of 
economic inefficiency is to broaden the tax base by repealing the tax preferences for the 
various favored types of income and expenditures. A  comprehensive base is more neutral 
than the present system regarding investment decisions, leading to a greater flow of invest­
ment funds to areas in which they are most productive, rather than to areas in which they 
earn the highest rate of after-tax return. Some argue that a comprehensive system would 
therefore enhance economic efficiency. For instance, W illiam Simon notes that “ it would 
eliminate the grossly inefficient misallocation of capital resources that occurs in the pre­
sent system, where the pattern of investment is determined as much by anomalies in the 
tax law as by their true productivity. ” 17 W ithout the tax preferences, resources would be 
allocated according to the before-tax social return, and marginal tax rates could be 
reduced. 18
This is not to say that all deductions or tax preferences should be summarily eliminated. 
First, to the extent one believes that these preferences serve desirable objectives and are 
more effective than other means of advancing them, a significant offsetting social cost
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might have to be attributed to more comprehensive taxation. 19 But also social benefits in 
reducing political special-interest lobbying costs may occur because there would be a 
general hesitancy to carve exceptions into a purely comprehensive base.
Second, it would be essential to retain in the law those deductions necessary to measure 
income correctly.20 For example, an income tax on a small business that does not allow a 
deduction for depreciation of a business computer or other office equipment can result in 
the assessment of an income tax on a business that, by current income-measurement stan­
dards, only breaks even, or even loses money. The end result would be to discourage busi­
ness undertakings in which the nondeductible expenses are important. So, while broaden­
ing the tax base generally increases economic efficiency, this benefit is lost if the tax base is 
broadened beyond the measure of true economic income.21
Simplicity
Broadening the tax base is often portrayed as the ultimate simplification. The Treasury 
proposal notes the following:
Simplicity is not wondering which receipts and checks to save because the tax law is too com­
plex and is constantly changing. Simplicity is not computing dozens of deductions and credits, 
and wondering all the while whether other means of saving tax might have been missed 
through ignorance of the laws.... A simple tax system would not require 41% of all taxpayers — 
and about 60% of those who itemize deductions — to engage professional assistance in prepar­
ing their tax returns.22
The “ pure” comprehensive system should be less complex for taxpayers and the admin­
istration. Under present law, “ the proliferation and expansion of exclusions, adjustments 
to income, deductions, and credits create a major burden of paperwork and make part-time 
bookkeepers of many Americans. ” 23 The caveat here is that, depending on the comprehen­
siveness of the base, the system would add some complexity —  for example, in the deter­
mination of values of fringe benefits, in-kind compensation, and so on. It is difficult to 
predict how the administrative aspect of taxation would be affected by this change; 
however, many proponents claim simplicity to be a major strength of the comprehensive 
tax.24
Fairness
Fairness is one of the advantages of base broadening most often mentioned. One per­
ceived standard of fairness is the treatment of taxpayers at similar income levels. The 
Treasury proposal notes this:
A tax that places significantly different burdens on taxpayers in similar economic circumstances 
is not fair... .If some items of income are omitted from the tax base, or if particular expenditures 
are treated preferentially, then taxpayers who are otherwise in equal positions will not be 
treated equally.25
Thus, the elimination of tax preferences that cause extreme differences in tax burdens 
among similarly situated taxpayers can help to restore confidence in the fairness of the 
system.
The elimination of these tax preferences would also enhance fairness with respect to the 
tax treatment across income classes. Fairness across income classes is the notion that those 
with high incomes should pay a greater percentage of their income in  tax than those with 
intermediate levels of income. The 1984 Treasury proposal states the following:
Defining the tax base comprehensively is necessary for the achievement of equity across 
income classes. Any exclusion of deduction is worth more, the higher the marginal tax bracket 
of the taxpayer. Moreover, wealthy taxpayers make relatively greater use of many provisions of 
the tax law th a t reduce the tax base, especially those yielding business deductions tha t result
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in the mismeasurement of economic income and produce tax shelters. As long as these tax pref­
erences exist, the tax system will be less progressive than  the rate structure suggests, and high 
marginal rates will be advocated as a means of achieving progressive taxation. 26
Another standard of fairness pertains to the lifetime burden of a taxpayer; for example, 
will different patterns of income or consumption alter the total tax burden over a long 
period of time? The current U .S. system, with its progressive rates and annual accounting 
period, may cause great discrepancies between taxpayers whose income and consumption 
patterns vary despite mechanisms, such as income averaging, designed to mitigate this 
undesirable result. Broader based systems with few deductions and flatter tax rates may 
tend even more to eliminate what many consider to be an undesirable and unfair result.
Some variation in tax burdens within income groups occurs today not because of manip­
ulative tax avoidance by sophisticated investors but because of transactions such as home 
purchasing and charitable giving. Eliminating those tax preferences would narrow the 
variation in tax burdens, but it could also have various side-effects.27 For example, the 
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction would not only increase the tax liability of 
most homeowners, but would also decrease the market value of most homes, thus creating 
serious problems for mortgagees who would hold over-valued mortgages.
In general, base broadening can yield substantial benefits, but all must be qualified to 
some extent. As for low tax rates, the Treasury proposal notes that “ it is far better to levy 
low tax rates on all income than to impose high tax rates on only part of income.” 28 But 
when statutory marginal tax rates are reduced and the tax base is broadened simultaneously, 
the effective marginal tax rate (the actual increase in tax resulting from an increase in 
income) may not decrease; the tax rate is lower, but more marginal income is subject to 
taxation.29
The efficiency case for base broadening is very strong in that eliminating tax influences 
in the marketplace would cause resources to be allocated to their best uses and marginal tax 
rates to be reduced, but it would be necessary to retain deductions required for a true 
measure of income. Elim inating deductions and credits would simplify the tax system, but 
adding hitherto missing income items to the tax base would complicate it.
Finally, fairness suggests that all income be taxed in the same way, but some persons who 
are by no means abusers of the current system —  such as homeowners —  might find the 
elimination of tax preferences distinctly unfair (at least, as they would define fairness).
Tax Base Broadening Combined With Rate Revision
Broadening the tax base is only the starting half of the analysis of a comprehensive 
income tax. The other important half is the progressiveness of the rate structure to be pro­
posed. A  nonprogressive rate structure may be thought of as more pro-savings, in that 
marginal saving is taxed at a single rate, as opposed to progressively higher rates. However, 
such a rate structure raises difficult political questions, and many have stated that a truly 
nonprogressive (that is, flat) rate tax could not be a feasible alternative because of its redis­
tribution of the tax burden from high-bracket taxpayers to low-bracket taxpayers. For 
example, under current law, families with less than $20,000 of income pay 5.5 percent of all 
individual income taxes, while those with $100,000 or more of income pay 22.2 percent. 
Under a pure flat-rate tax of 16.8 percent, the $20,000 group would pay 9.5 percent of 
individual income taxes, while the $100,000 group would pay 16.3 percent. Vertical equity 
is a widely accepted, advocated concept that would be difficult to change.30
It is important to note, however, that the incidence of the tax burden is essentially 
independent of the structure of the tax system. A  broad-based income tax system may be 
designed using personal exemptions, low income credits, and mildly progressive rates that 
will improve economic efficiency and still distribute the tax burden according to perceived
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social and political values. There would still be a shifting of tax burden from one taxpayer to 
another; however, material shifts from one income class to another may be avoided without 
undue complexity.
Finally, the effects on saving and economic efficiency of switching to a broader tax base, 
with lower progressive rates or a flat-rate structure, can be separated into two categories: 
those associated with differences between marginal tax rates on different activities and 
those associated with the levels of the marginal tax rates. To the extent that tax revision 
reduces differences in tax treatment of different sources or uses of income, tax-induced 
economic distortions would be diminished and economic efficiency would be improved.
The effects of reducing the overall level of marginal tax rates, however, are more ambiguous. 
Other things being equal, lower marginal tax rates should improve efficiency in individual 
decisions to work, save, and invest. W ith these tax revisions, however, other things would 
not be equal. As pointed out earlier, combining marginal rate reduction with base broaden­
ing will not necessarily decrease incremental tax because more marginal income is subject 
to taxation.31
Accretion Concept of Income
It should be noted that as the base is made more comprehensive it approaches the Haig- 
Simons definition, or the accretion concept of a tax base. Economists express the accretion 
system by the formula: I  = A  + C, where I  equals income, A  equals savings, or accretion in 
net worth, and C  equals consumption. In a pure accretion system all assets would be inven­
toried each year, liabilities deducted, and the taxpayer’s net worth determined at market 
value. The difference between the net worth amounts at the beginning and end of the 
accounting period reflects the net increase or decrease in the market value of the taxpayer’s 
command over consumption. The taxpayer’s expenditures for consumption for the period 
are added to this factor to produce the taxpayer’s income for the year.
W ith respect to savings, the accretion concept of income has many shortcomings as a tax 
base. As Blueprints notes, an especially serious drawback of an accretion income base is 
that it leads to what is sometimes called the “ double taxation” of savings; savings are 
accumulated after payment of taxes and the yield earned on those savings is then taxed 
again. Blueprints then goes on to point out that this has been recognized as a problem in the 
existing tax law and that the investment credit, accelerated depreciation, and the special 
tax rate for capital gains are techniques that have been introduced to make the tax system 
more neutral with respect to savings.32
Putting the accretion concept into the statutory language of the Internal Revenue Code 
means that adjusted gross income would be expanded to include items presently excluded 
by statute —  tax-exempt interest, the full amount of capital gains and losses, gifts and 
bequests, and the like —  and it would be further expanded to include the unrealized gains 
and losses attributable to the taxpayer’s net assets. M any of the current proposals dis­
cussed in the next section incorporate these accretion-type adjustments.
Approaches to a Progressive Comprehensive-Income Tax
The Treasury proposal, the Bradley-Gephardt Bill (S. 409, H.R. 800, (99th Cong.)), and 
various other proposals represent an effort to achieve a greatly broadened tax base com­
bined with lower marginal tax rates. Both proposals have a three-tiered progressive rate 
structure and are revenue neutral in the sense that they would leave tax revenues essen­
tially unchanged from what they would be under current law. Only a few deductions are 
allowed from the base, with the Treasury proposal the more restrictive.
In brief, the 1984 Treasury proposals would eliminate most special tax provisions for
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individuals such as the state and local tax deduction, dividend exclusion, and capital gains 
exclusion. It retains the home-mortgage-interest deduction, medical expense deduction, 
charitable contribution deduction, and IRA and Keogh deductions. Additionally, the pro­
posal would index interest income, the personal interest deduction, and the costs of capital 
assets for inflation.
W ith respect to business, the proposal levies a 33 percent corporate tax rate. It eliminates 
most special tax provisions for corporations, such as the investment tax credit, percentage 
depletion and the intangible drilling-cost deduction, corporate capital gains, the ACRS 
(the proposal replaces A CR S with a new depreciation system known as the Real Cost 
Recovery System). It substantially modifies the research and development credit, the 
foreign tax credit, and interest expense. Also, the proposal allows corporations to deduct 
one-half of dividends paid out of previously taxed earnings.
The Bradley-Gephardt “ Fair Tax”  would retain the deduction for employee business 
expenses, home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, state and local income taxes, 
and real property taxes. Social security and veterans’ benefits would remain tax-exempt. 
There would be modifications to certain current provisions, including the child care credit, 
the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, the deduction for medical expenses 
(limited to expenses in excess of 10 percent of adjusted gross income) and the $125,000 
exclusion of gain on the sale of a residence. M any other special exemptions, deductions, 
and credits presently available to individuals —  such as those for percentage depletion, 
intangible drilling costs, and the investment credit —  would be repealed. The entire 
amount of capital gains (without any excludable portion) would be subject to tax. This pro­
posal, like the Treasury proposal, while moving toward simplification, lower tax rates, and 
base broadening, is not a truly comprehensive income tax system. Instead, it is a partially 
comprehensive one aimed at curbing certain investment incentives in our current system 
that are perceived as being abusive or excessive.
Approaches to a Nonprogressive Comprehensive-Income Tax
The Helms Bill (S. 2200 (97th Cong.)) is a very broad-based income tax, more correctly 
called a comprehensive-income tax, deleting most current preferences (deductions, exclu­
sions, and credits). Special treatment for capital gains is eliminated, and other forms of 
income that are currently partially or totally exempt would be taxed. Gifts and inheritances 
would be included in the tax base, so beneficiaries and recipients would be subject to an 
annual tax with no provision for current estate and gift deductions and credits. This new, 
expanded base would be subject to a flat 10 percent rate.
The Siljander-Nickles “ Flat 10” (H.R. 200 (99th Cong.)) would broaden the tax base and 
impose a flat 10 percent tax rate. Flat 10 would also index the personal exemption for infla­
tion but would not make any revisions to the current corporate tax law. It would eliminate 
most special tax provisions for individuals, such as the dividend exclusion, the homeowner 
exclusion of up to $125,000 of the gain on the sale of a residence, the medical expense deduc­
tion, and the capital gains exclusion. Flat 10 would retain the home mortgage interest 
deduction, personal interest deduction, state and local tax deductions, charitable con­
tribution deduction, and IRA and Keogh deductions. Finally, Flat 10 is designed to raise 
approximately the same amount of revenue as our current federal tax system.
The Kemp-Kasten “ Fair and Simple Tax A ct” (S. 325, H.R. 777 (99th Cong.)) would 
dramatically simplify the present system by broadening the base substantially and lower­
ing the rate to 25 percent for individuals. However, the plan would retain many popular 
deductions, including mortgage interest, charitable contributions, accelerated cost re­
covery, and the tax-favored treatment of retirement savings and fringe benefits. The 
investment tax credit and other credit incentives would be eliminated. The Kem p-Kasten 
plan addresses the inherent regressivity issue with a special exclusion: 20 percent of salary
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in the social security wage base (now slightly in excess of $39,000) would be excluded and 
not subject to the flat 25 percent rate. As income rises above the wage base, the excluded 
portion would be added back into the tax base at a 12.5 percent rate, raising the marginal 
rate on earned income to as high as 28.4 percent [25 percent + (25 percent x 12.5 percent)].
Impact on Savings and Capital Formation
The table highlights some of the features of the Treasury proposal, Bradley-Gephardt, 
and Kemp-Kasten with respect to savings and capital formation.33
Table 5
Treatment of Capital Formation
Feature Treasury Proposal Bradley-Gephardt Kemp-Kasten
Depreciation Economic Modified ADR NCRS
Investment tax credit No No No
Indexation
Depreciation Yes No No
Inventory Yes No No
Interest Yes No No
Capital Assets Yes No Yes
Distinction in Tax
Rates for Capital
Gains No No Yes
One can quickly grasp from the table what the primary omissions are under each pro­
posal. The Bradley-Gephardt bill fails to take into account the effects of changes in the 
general price level (except to the extent that depreciation deductions are accelerated) using 
the 250-percent declining-balance method. “ Such a system in an inflationary economy 
would eventually lead to substantial distortions in the measurement of the tax base,” 
Pamela B. Gann has written in Tax Notes.34 The Kemp-Kasten bill, on the other hand, 
provides for partial capital gains indexation. (The basis of a capital asset is indexed for 
inflation. However, during a ten-year transition period, taxpayers may choose between an 
exclusion of 25 percent of net capital gains or indexation of basis.) Ms. Gann believes that 
“ it too would substantially mismeasure the tax base, from both the ad hoc nature of the 
ACRS depreciation system and the decision to index only capital assets for inflation.” 35 In 
contrast, the 1984 Treasury proposals are designed to achieve a more neutral taxation of 
capital income.
It must be remembered, however, that a comprehensive income tax is still an income tax, 
not a consumption tax, and these proposals would not eliminate the harm to saving that is 
inherent in any accretion tax. To the extent that the rates under a comprehensive income 
tax are lower than the rates under the present tax, the comprehensive income tax may be 
less detrimental to saving than the present tax. However, to take one example, the elimina­
tion of the capital gains exclusion means that the tax rates on some aspects of investment 
will be higher rather than lower. Thus, the comprehensive income tax proposals are 
unlikely to truly solve the problem of comparatively low savings levels in our economy.
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Potential Problems of a New System
The foregoing discussion has focused, for the most part, on the merits of an alternative, 
broad-based tax system. However, proponents of the current system see significant prob­
lems that would be inherent in any broad-based system. Some of the potential costs of these 
alternatives, then, should be considered along with the benefits.
For example, in addition to general changes in investment incentives caused by base 
broadening, reducing progressivity in the tax system might adversely affect municipal 
bond funding and ownership. There could be a loss of asset values since the current invest­
ment tax base (that is, buildings, plant, and equipment) would no longer provide the same 
levels of tax benefits through investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation. Cash 
flow problems may arise because fringe benefits are deferred, and retirement benefits may 
be taxed currently at fair market value.
A  broad-based tax system would also have a potential for regressivity because of the use of a 
uniform rate. There would probably be a reduction in charitable contributions, and many 
industries would be affected by the elimination of their special tax advantages. Finally, 
state and local tax revenues would almost certainly change because of state-income-tax 
linkage to a federal tax system.
The Problem of Transition
Evaluation of the relative benefits and costs of alternative systems is only part of the process 
in deciding whether to make a major change. Behavior patterns within the society, investment 
decisions, financing practices, and social relationships have been based, in many respects, 
on the existing tax system. W hat effect a major restructuring of the tax system would have 
on these relationships and investments during the transition phase must, of course, be con­
sidered. In short, even if an alternative system clearly is more beneficial, are the costs and 
complexities of making the change acceptable?
To the extent that any change in the system would disallow deductions or increase 
income with respect to investments made before enactment of a new tax system, it is evi­
dent that serious economic displacement can occur unless there is a substantial tran­
sitional period. But even with phase-ins or grandfathering, a new tax system would bring 
with it large windfall losses in the values of many assets. Even if home-mortgage-interest 
deductions were phased out over several years, for instance, homeowners might still suffer 
an immediate drop in the value of their houses.36 Thus, loss of expected tax benefits with 
respect to investments will almost certainly create a reduction in portfolio asset values.
Some are even concerned that a taxpayer revolt may result from a significant diminution 
of wealth and have suggested the necessity for a lengthy phase-in period —  up to twenty or 
thirty years for those who have homes as well as other investments subject to long-term 
mortgages. Transactions entered into after enactment of a new system would be subject to 
the new system at the time of the transaction. Transactions initiated before the date would 
be grandfathered to assure investment maintenance. (The Treasury proposals, while 
recognizing the need for liberal transition rules, do not come close to the type of liberality 
described above.)
Inherent in all of this, of course, is the problem that detailed records must be maintained. 
Furthermore, the very existence of transitional rules could create a situation of utmost 
complexity: two different systems of taxation operating in parallel for some period of 
time!
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Political Considerations
The perceived political disadvantages of a comprehensive system may be great. The first 
problem occurs in those systems that propose “ flat”  rates. Richard Goode puts it this 
way: “ I do not believe that the country is willing to accept [redistribution of taxes under a 
flat tax] and to discard a feature of the income tax that is essential to reach ability to pay, 
that has been present in the U .S. tax for the past 70 years.” 37 Or as Joseph Minarik notes, 
“ taxpayers with higher incomes are assumed to buy nonessentials with their last dollars of 
income; those with lower incomes are assumed to buy more basic items. It might follow, 
then, that persons with higher incomes could afford to pay tax at a higher rate.”38 Indeed, 
the 1984 Treasury proposal recommended against a revenue-neutral flat-rate tax because of 
“ the massive redistribution of tax burdens a pure flat tax would produce.” 39 B ut it should 
be noted that “ though a majority of the population appears to favor progressivity on 
grounds of fairness ... there is probably no agreement within that majority as to just how 
progressive the tax system should be.” 40
The second political problem arises from the potential elimination of deductions. Although, 
when surveyed, a majority of individuals favor a comprehensive income tax, they also favor 
maintaining the deductions they currently use. The C B O ’s publication Revising the Tax 
puts it clearly: “ Every special deduction, exemption, exclusion, and tax credit has a well- 
formed constituency, and many institutions, industries, and individuals feel dependent on 
these provisions for their financial well-being.”41 Furthermore, corporations depend heavily 
on tax incentives and credits as support for increasing production and capital investment. 
Dependence by both individuals and corporations is strong enough so that political pres­
sures preserving one or the other favorite provision make the passage of the broadened-base 
tax difficult to accomplish.
Even if the political obstacles can be overcome so that a comprehensive system was 
instituted, the system would still be subject to changes. Rates would probably be lowered in 
a comprehensive tax. To raise more revenues, Congress would be tempted subsequently to 
raise rates or add surcharges— possibly back to former nominal levels. Should this happen, 
the comprehensive system will have served as the vehicle to raise the tax level rather than 
serving its presently stated purposes.
The new tax would impose what can be tantamount to a revolutionary change, which 
may be disruptive economically and administratively. To the extent that such a change 
requires grandfather clauses and a lengthy transition period with parallel systems, it would 
be very difficult to administer. Furthermore, even though the broad-based tax (in a pure 
sense) would be pro-savings relative to the current system (because marginal rates would 
be lower), it is doubtful that a pure system would be considered because of its redistribution 
of the tax burden. For these practical reasons, then, the task force cannot state that such a 
revolutionary change is the best choice for encouraging saving relative to consumption. 
Gradual changes to the current system may be a better alternative.
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Chapter 4
PERIODIC CONSUMPTION TAX
The idea of taxing consumption dates to 1651, when Thomas Hobbes wrote the following: 
“ For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labor, 
consumeth little, should be more charged, than he that living idely [sic] getting little, and 
spendeth all he gets: seeing the one hath no more protection from the Commonwealth than 
the other?” 42 Income has traditionally been perceived as the primary indicator of an ability 
to pay taxes; but since the seventeenth century there have been those who argue that what a 
person consumes is better evidence of well-being than what is received as income. A  per­
son’s ability to consume is determined by both income and wealth and changes depending 
on whether income is constant and certain or is irregular and uncertain. Consumption, 
however, tends to be much smoother than income and can therefore be considered a much 
better index of “ ability to pay.” M any economists and political philosophers have followed 
Hobbes’s lead, asserting that income may be seen as a rough measure of what a person con­
tributes to society (via labor, investment, and so on). Consequently, consumption may be 
viewed as a rough measure of what a person withdraws from society. These thinkers believe 
that it is more equitable to tax consumption than income.
Consumption taxes can be fashioned in many different ways. An expenditure (or “ con­
sumed income” as it is labeled in the Treasury proposals) tax is levied on the total con­
sumption expenditures of the individual; a sales tax is levied on the sales of goods and 
services; and a value-added tax is levied on the difference between a firm’s sales and its 
purchases. Consumed-income taxes may be proportional or progressive; sales and value- 
added taxes may be imposed at a uniform rate on all commodities or at differing rates on 
various groups of commodities. Consumed-income taxes are collected from the consumer; 
sales and value-added taxes are collected from the seller. All three varieties of taxes 
will be discussed.
Basic Concepts of a Tax on Consumed Income
Sim ply stated, the base of the consumed income tax is the part of the individual’s income 
that is spent in the taxable year for consumption purposes. Keeping track of one’s con­
sumption outlays over a year’s time is the most direct measurement of consumed income, 
but a much simpler approach is available. B y starting with the proposition that com­
prehensive income includes any monetary benefit that can be used either for consumption 
or net savings, consumed income may be determined simply by subtracting net savings 
(which is the same as the change in net worth —  that is, the change in one’s assets less the 
change in one’s liabilities) from comprehensive income.
If it is accepted that th e  base in a consumed-income tax system starts with comprehen­
sive income less savings (or plus negative savings), two problems are encountered —  defin­
ing the comprehensive-income base and defining savings. To avoid the problems of a 
comprehensive-income definition in relation to a consumption-based tax, Blueprints, 
Aaron and Galper’s lifetime income tax, and many other statements on the subject adopt a
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cash-flow tax. In very basic terms, the comprehensive-tax base would be determined by 
including all cash inflows and deducting all cash outflows allocated to saving or invest­
ment. The balance would represent consumption, and tax would be paid on that amount 
less appropriate exemptions.
Because of the difficulties inherent in accounting for saving or consumption when hous­
ing or consumer durable goods (for example, automobiles) are concerned, Blueprints pre­
sents a concept that can be central to the operation of a periodic consumption tax: the 
qualified account and the nonqualified/tax-prepayment account.43 A  qualified account 
would be similar to an IRA: It can be established by any financial institution (including a 
brokerage) that keeps records of deposits and withdrawals. The account would be permit­
ted to buy and sell any type of financial asset (stocks, bonds, savings deposits, stock or 
mutual funds, futures, and the like). Investment yield (including realized appreciation) 
would escape tax altogether. A  taxpayer’s additions to a qualified account would be deduc­
tible from the current tax base. A  comparison of an individual’s balance in a qualified 
account at the beginning and at the end of the tax period would determine whether that 
person was a net saver or dissaver over the accounting period.
Unlike the procedure with an IRA, however, a taxpayer may withdraw from the qualified 
account at any time and for any reason. There would be no limits to the amounts con­
tributed or withdrawn; however, any withdrawal from a qualified account is included in 
the tax base for the year withdrawn. No distinction is made between “ principal” and 
“ income.” O f course, to the extent funds are reinvested in a similar account, a correspond­
ing deduction is permitted.
For example, an individual deposits $100 in a qualified savings-bank account, where it 
earns 10 percent annual interest. In the year the $100 is deposited, the individual would be 
allowed to deduct $100 from current receipts in computing a tax base. If, in the following 
year, the taxpayer withdraws the principal plus the earned interest— now equal to $110—  
that amount would be added to receipts from other sources in computing the tax base. If the 
savings deposit were left in the bank instead to accumulate interest, there would be no 
current tax consequences. Any future withdrawal would add to taxable receipts in the year 
it is made.
The concept of a nonqualified account is introduced to handle problems occurring with 
major consumption purchases when the use of qualified accounts may prove cumbersome. 
For example, personal housing has been considered a consumption item rather than a 
savings item by various commentators. An example to consider would be that of a young, 
wage-earning couple, saving for the downpayment on their first home. If the amount saved 
from earnings in each of the past years was placed into a qualified account, the amount has 
avoided tax on that part of earnings; however, removal of the downpayment from a 
qualified account in one year will subject the entire amount of that payment to tax. 
Depending on the marginal rate structure, much of that tax may be at a higher bracket than 
the deduction for the original deposit to the qualified account.
To avoid this type of problem, not only for housing but for other consumer durable goods, 
Blueprints proposes permitting taxpayers to make deposits into so-called prepaid accounts. 
The wage-earning individual placing $100 in a nonqualified savings account would not 
receive a deduction for that $100 and, accordingly, would “ prepay” the tax on that amount, 
even though it has been put into savings.44 However, neither the principal amount nor any 
earnings on it would be subject to tax when withdrawn from the account. Investments from 
nonqualified accounts would occur outside the tax system. Thus, no tax is incurred when 
the nonqualified account funds are used toward the purchase of a new home.
The Blueprints study presents an analysis showing that the present value of prepayment 
accounting and qualified account treatment is identical to both the government and the 
taxpayer, barring changes in tax rates between the two years involved.45 An example will 
illustrate this. An individual in the 40-percent bracket deposits $100 in an investment 
account in year one, at a 10-percent annual interest rate; this person withdraws the $110 of
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accumulated funds from the account in year two with a 40-percent marginal tax rate to use 
on consumption. If the qualified-account approach was used, the government would 
collect no tax in year one but would collect $44 of tax in year two, leaving the individual with 
the after-tax amount of $66. On the other hand, if the $100 was deposited in a prepaid 
account in year one, a tax of $40 would be collected in year one but no tax would be collected 
in year two (with prepaid accounts, the incremental earnings escape additional tax). 
However, the government would have achieved 10-percent earnings on the collected tax 
during the second year, so it still has $44 by the end of the second year. The individual, at 
the end of year two, has $110 in the account but has paid $40 of tax in year one and has 
forgone 10-percent earnings on that tax liability in the second year. Economically, that per­
son is left $66 after tax. Thus, at the end of year two, both the individual taxpayer and the 
government are in equivalent economic positions, regardless of whether qualified or pre­
paid accounts are utilized.
Illustrations of Tax-Base Components
The table below lists some of the cash inflow and outflow items that would be important 
in arriving at a consumption-tax base. The discussion that follows elaborates on the treat­
ment of some of the more important items. The policy that the table and discussion seek to 
demonstrate is the inclusion of broadly defined income and a deduction for investment and 
saving outflows.
(The discussion following the table relates back to the numbers of the table: arabic for 
cash inflows, roman for outflows.)
Table 6
Consumption-Tax Inflows and Outflows
Inflows Outflows
(1) Wages, dividends, interest, rents
(2) Sale of investment assets
(3) Gifts and bequests (iii) Gifts and bequests
(4) Unemployment compensation, fringe 
benefits
(iv) Contributions to plans
(5) Consumer durables
(6) Loan proceeds
(7) Life insurance proceeds (vii) Life insurance premiums
(8) Unincorporated business income (viii) Business expenditures
(9) Qualified account withdrawals (ix) Qualified account contributions
(x) Charitable contributions
(xi) Necessary expenditures
(xii) State and local income taxes
Although it may be apparent to the reader why certain items are taxed or not in a 
consumption-based system, the discussion to follow highlights particular items that 
merit elaboration.
(2) Sale of investment assets. Sales proceeds would be includable in the base in full; no 
attempt would be made to determine income or loss as is done under our present system. 
The theory is that a deduction would have been allowed for the full cost of the investment 
when made, and the sales proceeds are now available in full for consumption. To the extent 
a reinvestment of all or part of the proceeds in new savings takes place, a deduction occurs 
from the base for the current year.
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(3, iii) Gifts. One option is to treat gifts as being includable by the donee and deductible 
by the donor. This is defended on the grounds that the donated assets are no longer available 
to the donor but are available to the donee for consumption. B y including the gift in the tax 
base of the recipient, however, the burden shifts to the donee to avoid tax on that amount. 
This would be done by reinvesting part or all of the gift in a deductible fashion, such as in a 
qualified account, or by selling gifted property to raise funds for the tax liability. It can also 
provide an opportunity for planning (or abusing, depending on the perspective) intergener­
ation transfers, with high-bracket parents making gifts to low-bracket children.
If funds for the gift are withdrawn from a qualified account, the withdrawal requires 
inclusion of that amount in the tax base, and the gift merely results in a zero liability on 
those funds. If funds for the gift come from a prepaid or nonqualified account, the donor 
may use that deduction to shelter other income.
Another option would be to have the donor “ prepay” the consumption tax on the amount 
transferred. Because the tax has already been paid, the donee would not have to pay any 
further taxes on either the transfer or on any returns earned by saving it. This option, 
however, adds a degree of record-keeping complexity: The donee must segregate the 
returns on the transferred property from all other investment income.46 This method, 
however, eliminates a major criticism of the first option— that is, the system’s tolerance of 
the “ wealthy miser”  who would almost completely escape tax under a tax on consumed 
income.47
A third option would be to include the gift in the tax base of both donor and donee. This 
would make lifetime income the base of the consumed-income tax.48 However, this option 
also amounts to double taxation of the gift —  in essence, deeming the act of making the 
transfer a type of consumption.49 The lifetime income tax adopts this option, but such a 
method subjects the amounts bequested to an averaging provision if the amounts trans­
ferred are large relative to annual income.
(3,iii) Bequests. Includable by recipients, but deductible by the estate. Death continues 
to have tax consequences, even in a consumption-tax framework. Assets transferred by will 
now go into someone else’s consumption base; and, to the extent this occurs by terminating 
the decedent’s interest in a qualified account, income and deduction will match.
However, when certain assets pass from a nonqualified account, the consumption tax on 
the assets has been prepaid by the decedent on assets that will not be consumed. The con­
cept of equity may require a tax-refund mechanism being established (perhaps by using an 
averaging convention for a period of years in determining the bracket). An alternative 
approach is permitting acquisition of those assets by heirs without inclusion in the heirs’ 
tax base (possibly, by allowing transfer into a prepaid account of the heir).
(5) Consumer durables. Because consumer durables like homes, autos, or major ap­
pliances provide flows of services over periods of years that are not readily measured in 
dollars (imputed rent, imputed transportion costs, and so forth) a practical —  if not 
theoretically correct —  approach to dealing with such items is to treat their costs as current 
consumption. Thus, no deduction would be permitted for costs of acquisition, but no tax 
would be imposed on funds obtained from their sale.
The theoretical error in this approach is the forced prepayment of tax on future years’ 
consumption during the current year. For example, an automobile purchased for $8,000 is 
expected to last for four or five years. Yet, by not permitting any deduction for a part of that 
$8,000, the future value of that consumption is currently su b ject to  ta x . H ow ever, with an 
automobile or appliances, it may be argued that either the life of the asset or its cost is small 
enough so that the prepayment is a low price to pay for simplicity. In the case of the home, 
however, financing the purchase with borrowing and the use of nonqualified accounts per­
mits the distortions to be minimized or eliminated.
(6) Loan proceeds. An important advantage of the qualified/nonqualified alternative is 
seen in the treatment of borrowing. In this context, it is expected that financing transac­
tions may occur through either qualified or prepaid accounts, and depending on an individual’s
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creditworthiness, loans can be made for substantially more than the balance in an account 
—  resulting in both qualified and prepaid accounts with negative balances.
To the extent that a loan is taken from a qualified account, the proceeds are included in 
the consumption-tax base (a deduction is permitted for proceeds reinvested in some aspect 
of saving). Earlier in this chapter, discussion focused on the downpayment portion of home 
ownership. In actuality, the bigger problem (because of relative dollars involved) arises 
with the mortgage on the remaining purchase price. If the taxpayer takes out a mortgage loan 
by means of a qualified account, he or she will have created a large inclusion in tax base with­
out an offsetting deduction because the proceeds are considered used for consumption.
The nonqualified-account alternative permits significant loans for the purchase of such 
goods as homes or automobiles without substantial tax payments in the year of borrowing. 
Neither principal nor interest is deductible on repayment, but the tax on consumption rep­
resented by use of the home or automobile is essentially deferred and paid during the period 
of use.
In general, it should be noted that nonbusiness interest would not be deductible. The 
exception occurs when the loan giving rise to the interest liability was taken by means of a 
qualified account because the loan proceeds were subject to tax in the year of the loan. In 
that event, even though loan proceeds were used for consumption purposes (college tuition, 
for example), both principal and interest repayments would be deductible as additions to a 
qualified account.
(7, vii) Life insurance. These funds would be included in the tax base under two theories: 
(1) Under general definitions of broadly based income, similar to gifts and bequests, they 
would be considered includable; (2) a life insurance policy would be seen as a saving or 
investment vehicle and premium payments would be, therefore, deductible.50 All pre­
miums paid by policyholders for whole life insurance would be tax deductible, while pre­
miums paid by employers for policyholders would not be imputed to policyholder’s tax 
bases. All receipts from life insurance policies would be included in the tax base of the 
recipient.
(8, viii) Unincorporated business. Gross receipts would be includable in the consumption- 
tax base. Business expenditures would be deductible in full, including capital investment. 
Theoretically, the amount allocated to savings or investment is the cost of assets being used 
in those sectors of the economy. To the extent that cost includes buildings or equipment, 
the amount of otherwise taxable inflows allocated to buildings or equipment should 
escape taxation.
As a practical matter, equipment and structures tend to be financed in some part 
through borrowing. To the degree that borrowing was done by means of a qualified account 
and the proceeds were invested in business property, there would be no current tax conse­
quences. To the extent that an immediate windfall was sought by borrowing from a 
nonqualified/prepaid account with an immediate, deductible offset for investment in a 
business asset, limits on loss carrybacks or carryovers can still be part of our tax system, and 
future repayments (including interest) will be nondeductible.
Under this concept, depreciation will not come into play at all. W ith accounting for these 
costs handled completely through cash flows, there will be no need for depreciation allow­
ances or accounting.
(x) Charitable contributions. A  theoretical argument can be made, unlike that for state 
and local income taxes, that charitable contributions represent an individual decision on 
how to consume available funds; therefore, a deduction from the consumption tax base 
should not be allowed. An equally good argument can be made that contributions to charity 
do not benefit an individual directly, except as the overall betterment of society benefits 
each individual. Thus, charitable contributions may be seen as being more akin to gifts. 
The gift analogy fails if one assumes that it will not be followed through to the end user; that 
is, inasmuch as a charitable institution includes the amount of gifts in its tax base, the 
institution should obtain corresponding deductions on a social-policy, if not a saving or
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investment, basis. It is not practical to include the amounts expended by charitable 
organizations in the tax bases of their beneficiaries (students at a university, for instance). It 
would seem practical, however, to assume that any consumption-based system adopted in 
the United States would allow a deduction from the base for charitable contributions. This 
was the position adopted in Blueprints. 51
(xi) Necessary expenditures. For social reasons that the body politic deems appropriate, 
the base would probably be reduced further by “ necessary expenditures” (for example, 
food, shelter, medicine, and clothing). Such allowance may be made through standard 
deductions, exemptions, or both. Defining what “necessary” means m ay be difficult; however, 
the U.S. system incorporates items that were just as difficult to define but were specified 
accurately to satisfy Congresses in the past. Nevertheless, the theoretical consumption 
base is eroded to the extent such compromises are made.
Corporate Earnings Under Blueprints
Individuals consume; corporations do not. Thus, a comprehensive tax on consumption 
(unlike that on income) need not even wrestle with the problems of corporate earnings and 
how those earnings should be attributed to individual taxpayers. They should not; nor 
should the corporate tax system, then, be retained —  at least, so goes this argument in 
Blueprints. 52
The significant advantage from excluding corporations from the tax system altogether 
comes in giving them the ability to make business decisions unbiased by taxes. Economic 
consequences —  not tax consequences —  would thus drive the corporate decision-making 
process. The question of what is income that is subject either to tax or attribution to 
shareholders does not arise. Even in a broad-based, comprehensive-income tax system, 
where the corporate and individual subsystems are integrated, complex definitional prob­
lems of income remain because of the need to ascertain the amounts attributable to each 
corporate shareholder. No such problem arises in a consumption-based tax system.
Theoretically, the above argument m ay be correct; politically, it is likely to be untenable. 
The concept of corporations “ escaping” tax is a politically sensitive one today. That sen­
sitivity will doubtlessly not change merely because the tax system focuses on consumption 
rather than income.
Corporate Earnings Under the Lifetime Tax
As an alternative, the Aaron-Galper lifetime tax (which is consumption based) would 
have a two-part corporation tax.53 The first would be a tax on cash flow. The corporation 
tax base would include total receipts of the corporation from all sources other than the sale 
of stock less all business expenses, including investment in the paid-for year. Deductions 
for business expenditures on consumption items for the benefit of employees or owners 
would be denied, and the business tax base would include the proceeds from borrowing. 
Corporations would be entitled to deduct all debt-service payments but no deductions for 
dividends or any other cash distribution to stockholders. If firms borrowed to finance 
investment, no tax would result in  th e year th e in vestm en t w as made; the expenditure on 
the investment would just offset the proceeds from the loan. If earnings on the investment 
differed from the repayment of debt, corporate cash flow and tax liabilities would be 
affected.
The second element of the tax on corporations would be a withholding tax on all dis­
tributions from corporations to both individuals and other corporations not subject to U.S. 
taxation. This tax would apply to dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and any other cash 
distribution. Exemptions from such withholding would be granted for payments into
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qualified accounts of U.S. taxpayers, but this withholding tax would be final for taxpayers 
not subject to U .S. taxation. However, the international trade difficulties raised by any 
switch to a consumption base should be remembered: For example, U .S. tax treaties are 
based on an income tax system, and they would have to be renegotiated. Although the prob­
lem is not insurmountable (witness the European experience with VAT), the effects of such 
a withholding tax remain a serious consideration.
Rate Structure and Progressivity
B y definition, a consumption base is narrower than a comprehensive-income base (it 
reduces that base by net saving); in order to capture the same amount of revenues as under 
a comprehensive-income base, the rate structure must, of necessity, be higher. Certainly, 
this would be true if the consumption tax was meeting its major planned purpose of increas­
ing the base of net savings in this country. Recognizing the above, taxpayers would not find 
the same drop in marginal rates under a consumption-tax base as they would under a 
comprehensive-income tax base. For example, the Treasury proposals would provide a top 
income-tax rate of 35 percent on individuals, using a tax base that would be more of a 
comprehensive-income model. Those rates cannot be maintained under a consumption- 
tax approach; likewise, the rates under a consumption tax would not need to be maintained 
under a comprehensive-income tax.
The potential for substantial rate reduction represents one of the most important 
arguments for the comprehensive-income tax. For example, under the Treasury approach, 
each additional dollar of saving or investment income would be subject to tax at no more 
than 35 percent —  a powerful saving incentive compared with the present system. Con­
sumption-tax proponents, on the other hand, would argue that under their proposals each 
additional dollar of savings or investment income would be subject to a zero rate tax, at 
least until withdrawn for consumption.
While a comprehensive-consumption tax must, by definition, have a higher rate struc­
ture than a comprehensive-income tax, it need not be set at higher rates than the present, 
noncomprehensive income tax. Professor David Bradford a few years ago updated the 
Blueprints rates structure (to which he had made major contributions as a leader of the 
project). This rate structure was required to yield approximately the same distribution of 
tax burdens as under 1976 tax law (when there was a top 70 percent tax on unearned 
income). Adjusting for inflation from 1976 to 1984, Professor Bradford found that, using a 
comprehensive-income tax base, exemptions would be about $3,000 per return, plus $1,900 
for each taxpayer and dependent. For the model consumption-tax base, exemptions would 
be about $2,800 per return, plus $1,500 per taxpayer and dependent. More importantly, the 
top marginal rate for the Blueprints comprehensive-income tax model would be 38 percent 
— not reached until a level of $75,300 of income was attained. The consumption tax, on the 
other hand, would have a top bracket of only 40 percent, but would be reached at $56,400 of 
taxable cash flow. This can be contrasted with the post-1983 system where the top rate 
(joint returns) is 50 percent, but it is not reached until taxable income exceeds $162,400.54
While implicit in what has gone before, it should be explicitly noted that the concept of a 
progressive tax system is as applicable to a consumption tax as to an income tax. The 
degree of progressivity under a consumption system is basically a matter of how pro­
savings the system should be. Given the same base, progressive rates are more pro-savings 
because they discourage additional consumption.
There has been criticism of consumption-tax systems on the grounds that the tax is, by 
nature, regressive. Whether this criticism arises because of a common perception of a tax on 
consumption as being, essentially, a sales tax or a value-added tax is not clear; nonetheless, 
there is no reason why a consumption tax cannot be as progressive as budgetary or fairness 
considerations dictate. Granted, progressivity brings complexity, insofar as current collec­
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tion of tax is concerned. As a practical matter, those complexities are certainly no greater 
than under an income tax model, and a combination of estimated taxes and withholding 
should continue to satisfy Treasury’s need for current funds.
Wealth Accumulation
A tax system that includes the return on labor (wages) in the base, that permits a deduction 
for amounts allocated to investment, that allows returns on that investment to accumulate 
tax free (through the qualified-account concept), and that does away with the tax on cor­
porate earnings is bound to be perceived by some as being inherently unfair, placing a dis­
proportionate burden on the wage earner. Wealth seems to be concentrated in a relatively 
small number of families; consequently, the ability of that fortunate minority group to take 
particular advantage will undoubtedly be propounded as an important reason not to enact 
the new system.
There is merit to this criticism, though there are also arguments to the contrary. For any 
specific individual, there are two major sources of wealth accumulation: The first is his or 
her own earnings, and it is clear that these would be included in the tax base; second, 
however, is the transfer of assets from others, such as through gifts or inheritance. These 
transfers would also be included in the consumption-tax base, at the same progressive rates 
as return on labor. Obviously, such transfers would provide their own incentives for placing 
substantial transferred assets into a qualified account to obtain a current deduction from 
the base, but to the extent so allocated, the assets are not available for consumption.
Further, notions of fairness may be addressed through the progressive-rate structure 
applied to the consumption-tax base. Obviously, such a definition of fairness will be in the 
eye of the beholder; and it is bound, therefore, to flow largely from fiscal and political con­
siderations. Under the present system, the concept of horizontal equity holds that people 
who are making the same income should pay the same tax. Such a concept would be irrele­
vant (or at least unmeasurable) if a consumption-tax approach were to be adopted. People 
whose tradition and heritage have tended to equate tax paid against the income received 
with the very concept of fairness may find the new definition of horizontal equity —  one in 
which people who consume equally should pay the same tax —  to be like playing with new 
rules whose implications are not understood. Thus, the political push for strongly pro­
gressive rates is likely to become even more severe under a consumption-tax approach than 
has been the case heretofore.
Even if all amounts removed for consumption become subject to tax, the act of permit­
ting invested amounts to build up tax free will certainly make it easier to accumulate 
wealth than it would be under an income tax system. Since those who come into the system 
with substantial wealth (including inherited wealth set aside in a qualified account) will be 
able to add to that wealth free of tax, the concentration problem will be a real one. “ The 
wealthy do not pay their fair share of taxes” is a comment often heard under our present 
system (though invariably without a definition of what “ their fair share” is). In the absence 
of other provisions, that perception is bound to increase, over a period of time, if the tax sys­
tem is operating with a consumption tax.
Thus, the need for significant progressivity in a consumed-income tax system is apparent. 
Further, many proponents of a consumption-tax system (including former Treasury Sec­
retary Simon) recognize the likely need for a gift- or inheritance-tax structure that would be 
made applicable to the most wealthy to serve the social goal of preventing undue wealth 
from accumulating in so few hands.55
Transition Issues
It is in the transition to a true consumption-tax system that many severe problems arise.
26
Obviously, a tax system based on income, though more broadly defined and with additional 
savings incentives, retains the basic political concepts under which the United States has 
been operating for over half a century. However, even if consumption is now defined as 
income less net savings, the shift from an income base to a consumption base would be a dif­
ficult one.
In simple terms, a consumption system rewards the saver and penalizes the consumer, 
while an income tax system penalizes the saver and takes little account of consumption. 
Thus, individuals today who have accumulated assets over a lifetime of labor —  par­
ticularly if the accumulation has been with a mind to later consumption —  have paid 
income tax both on the return for their labor (wages) and on the return to the after-tax funds 
invested (dividends, interest, and so fo rth ). Feldstein puts it this way: “ [I]ndividuals who 
have accumulated savings out of after-tax income should not be subject to a new round of 
taxes when those savings are consumed.” 56
Consider, for example, a wage earner who has built a moderate stock portfolio with after­
tax earnings and the reinvestment of after-tax dividends. If the tax system changed over­
night to a cash-flow tax, the entire proceeds from the sale would again be subject to tax 
when removed for consumption. On the other hand, should transition rules designate those 
assets as tax prepaid, then appreciation on them would escape tax altogether, even though 
the assets will ultimately be used for consumption. Likewise, income on wealth accumulated 
prior to adoption of the new system would also escape taxation in any form if the underlying 
assets were designated as prepaid.
Retired persons, or those close to retirement, would be especially hard hit by the immediate 
adoption of a consumption tax where assets were considered part of a qualified account. 
Very young adults just entering the labor force (particularly those with no inherited nest 
egg) also would be disadvantaged: They are heavy consumers in those early years, with lit­
tle opportunity for saving. On the other hand, those who have over generations successfully 
accumulated disproportionate amounts of wealth would be particularly advantaged by 
immediate adoption of a consumption-tax system treating all assets as prepaid.
Younger families would also be hard hit by the immediate adoption of a consumption tax. 
For example, a major consumer purchase like a home that is taxed as consumption may 
cause an enormous redistribution of wealth away from homeowners. Such a change may 
increase the price of property beyond the financial means of many families. As some in the 
real estate industry maintain, a consumption tax applied to the purchase of a home would 
clearly have “ a negative impact on the homeownership rate and economic growth.” 57
Obviously, there are important political factors to consider also. The consumed-income 
tax, although perhaps attractive because it is new, is not well understood. The definition of 
“ necessary expenditures” alone would become a highly charged issue, subject to exten­
sive lobbying.
The state tax systems, as a matter of survival, may be forced to adopt a consumption tax. 
First, there may be an impact on state and local revenues because state income tax is linked 
to the federal system. Second, there may be massive compliance problems; taxpayers 
would continue maintaining certain accounts for calculating state income tax plus the new 
records necessary for the federal consumed-income tax. In the final analysis, the primary 
defect of a consumed-income tax is the one shared with the personal income tax: Both 
require a high degree of voluntary compliance to maintain their effectiveness.
Although transition problems would be great, in the context of this study the consump­
tion tax has many advantages. The main advantage is that it may well promote savings by 
discouraging consumption. The virtue of this is stressed in the following quote from the Tax 
Foundation: “ John Stuart M ill said the only ‘perfectly unexceptionable and just principle 
of income tax’ is to ‘exempt all savings.’ He believed the resultant savings would stimulate 
investment in wealth-producing equipment and facilities, thus promoting the best interests 
of all.” 58
The consumption tax would remove distortions between present and future consump-
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tion because the rate on all savings would be zero. If corporate taxes were eliminated in con­
junction with the consumption tax, distortions among business investments would also be 
removed. The consumption tax eliminates double taxation of savings —  one of the major 
complaints about the current system.
However, a consumption tax that was revenue neutral (as compared with an income tax) 
would require higher tax rates than those on an income base.59 B y definition, consumption 
is smaller than income. Although taxing consumption would eliminate the distortion be­
tween present and future consumption, the higher tax rates increase the distortion between 
present consumption and leisure choices.
As discussed earlier, a common view, expressed here by the 1984 Treasury Report, is that 
aggregate savings under a consumption tax will increase because the incentive for saving—  
which then would be exem pt— would increase: “ However, because the net return to saving 
would be higher, any particular goal for future consumption could be attained with less 
current saving; this would reduce the need to save.” 60 This income effect makes an 
individual richer, possibly inducing that person to consume more in the present, thus 
offsetting any effect from the substitution of savings for present consumption.61
M any writers suggest that consumption is a better measure than income is of the ability 
to pay tax. Their argument is that lifetime income is the appropriate base for taxation, and 
that annual consumption is more stable and hence a better proxy for average lifetime 
income than annual income.62 This lifetime perspective allows an equal treatment of tax­
payers with the same endowments (or present value of lifetime incomes) .63 Equality would 
then exist in the sense that the tax would be neutral to when, during a lifetime, one consumed 
wealth. Now the income tax penalizes those who want to save for future consumption.64
The consumption tax can resolve many administrative problems found in the current 
system (though, as discussed, it would create its own set). The tax would eliminate the need 
to account for depreciation and inventories as well as the problem of defining capital 
income, which is heightened by inflation. There would be no need to index for inflation at 
all because expenditures would reflect current prices. Unrealized income would receive no 
advantage as compared with realized capital gains because both would be taxed only when 
withdrawn for consumption.65
Finally, the present U.S. tax system is not a pure income tax system, but it does contain 
various elements of a consumption tax —  that is, deductions for retirement savings, lack of 
imputed taxable income from certain savings vehicles such as life insurance, and so forth. 
Further, since the U.S. system starts with income in defining consumption, Americans are 
used to working with that concept (though it is imperfectly defined from a consumption- 
tax point of view). As pointed out by Harvey Galper of the Brookings Institution (and 
Associate Director of the Office of Tax Analysis, Treasury Department, at the time the 
Blueprints study was undertaken), the first steps toward a consumption-tax model can be 
taken in the context of our present tax system; to the extent they involved scaling back 
current income tax deductions, these steps can also serve to satisfy short-term revenue 
requirements imposed by congressional budget committees.
Examples of changes that would begin a trend from an income- to a consumption-based 
system include the following: treatment of specific items of untaxed compensation, deduc­
tibility of particular types of interest, deductibility of state sales taxes and charitable con­
tributions for nonitemizers, or readdressing the unified credit levels and rate levels at 
which the estate and g ift ta x  stru ctu re reductions should halt.
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Chapter 5
TRANSACTIONAL CONSUMPTION TAXES: 
VALUE-ADDED AND RETAIL SALES TAX
This chapter discusses two variations of transactional consumption taxes: the value- 
added tax (VAT) and the retail sales tax. A  VAT and retail sales tax differ significantly only 
in the ways they are administered; consequently, no question exists about the effects of the 
retail sales tax that would not apply equally to the value-added tax.66 Thus, the discussion 
centers on the VAT —  its operation, its advantages and disadvantages, and the comparison 
with other taxes. The logical conclusion of such a discussion is a consideration of how a 
national retail-sales tax differs from a VAT.
What is VAT?
VAT is an indirect tax —  that is, a tax levied directly only on goods and services and, 
therefore, only indirectly on persons. Indirect taxes include retail sales taxes, excise taxes, 
and import duties (as compared with direct taxes, examples of which include individual or 
corporate income taxes and gift or inheritance taxes).
Theoretically, VAT is a tax on the value added to goods or services by each separate pro­
cessor in the production and distribution chain. In actuality, it is a tax on the increase in the 
sales price of the goods or services as they pass through that chain. Ultim ately, however, it 
is a tax on consumption— on the amount spent for the product by the final consumer. The 
consumer ultim ately bears the burden of the tax, even though the actual payer of the bulk 
of the tax is the manufacturer or processor.
A  tax on consumption, incurred only when money is spent, puts a premium on savings as 
contrasted with the bias against savings in an income tax, under which part of the income 
itself must be paid to the government and cannot be saved. Accordingly, despite its politi­
cal unpopularity, there are arguments that a VAT m ay increase the level of private saving 
and generate a corresponding increase in capital formation and growth.
Types of VAT
At its simplest, under VAT each processor collects a tax on sales of goods or services, 
deducts the amount of taxes paid, and remits the difference to the government. If the pro­
cessor pays more tax than is collected, the processor receives a refund. There are three types 
of VAT, classified according to their treatments of purchases of capital items: gross product, 
income, and consumption VAT.
Under the gross product VAT, no deduction is allowed for tax paid on capital items; the 
payer can only recover through an increase in the selling price of goods produced directly or 
indirectly by the taxed capital item. Under the income type, recovery of the VAT paid 
would be allowed ratably over the life of the asset; thus, VAT paid on the purchase of a capi-
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ta l item with a five-year life would be one-fifth recovered in the year of purchase and one- 
fifth in each of the following four years.
Both the gross product and income versions of the VAT penalize capital investment by 
placing an additional tax burden on capital equipment purchases. The tax would be 
imposed on the capital good itself and on the output produced by the capital good. In con­
trast, a consumption-type VAT would not affect the methods of production because sub­
stituting capital for labor (or vice versa) would not alter a firm’s total taxes; it also would 
not influence the decision to save or consume. The consumption type will be the only one 
considered in detail here.67
Methods of Determining the VAT Base
There are three generally recognized methods of determining the tax base to which a VAT 
rate may be applied: (1) under the addition method, the firm totals its payments for labor 
and capital, subtracts from this sum its payments to other businesses for production 
facilities, and applies the tax rate to the resulting amount; (2) under the subtraction 
method, the firm subtracts all its payments to other businesses from gross sales and 
receipts and applies the applicable VAT rate to the remainder; or (3) under the invoice (or 
credit) method, the firm multiplies its total sales by the applicable tax rate and subtracts 
from the resulting tax liability all of the VAT paid to suppliers, as shown by the invoices for 
purchases from other firms. This is equivalent to getting a tax credit for the VAT the firm 
has paid against its own VAT liability. These three alternatives are illustrated by the example 
in table 7 on page 31, which is taken directly from the 1984 Treasury proposals. That exam­
ple assumes an economy with only three firms —  one each in manufacturing, wholesaling, 
and retailing. The manufacturing sector sells all of its output to the wholesale sector; the 
wholesale sector buys only from the manufacturing sector and sells all of its output to the 
retail sector. The rate of tax is 10 percent.
So that the three methods of determining a VAT liability may be compared with the more 
familiar income-tax-base calculation, a highly simplified profit and loss statement for 
income tax purposes appears as exhibit 1 in Appendix A. For purposes of this exhibit, the 
beginning and ending inventory is limited to purchased material, and no attempt is made 
to assign overhead costs to inventory. (This is because VAT theoretically depends on the 
kinds of expenditures made, rather than on how they may be treated for financial or income 
tax accounting purposes.) The various accounts reflected are identified according to 
whether they are used in determining a VAT liability under the invoice, the subtraction, or 
the addition method.
These illustrations are included here primarily for the sake of being complete. It is impor­
tant to demonstrate the various methods of collection and to point out that VAT can be 
levied as a direct tax, but consideration of VAT has almost always been in the context of an 
indirect tax. As such, the invoice method has, in practice, appeared to be the most appro­
priate means of determining liability. This is the method employed by the members of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and most other countries that have adopted 
VAT.
To elaborate on the invoice method, the tax-collecting chain begins with the sale of raw 
materials on which VAT is ch arged b y  th e seller at a fixed rate and remitted by that seller to 
the government. The purchasing manufacturer thereafter charges VAT on the sale of the 
finished or semifinished product to another manufacturer or a distributor. However, 
instead of remitting the total collection to the government, the manufacturer is entitled to 
reimbursement for the VAT paid on the purchase of the raw material. Only the difference, 
or the tax on the “ value added” by the manufacturer, is paid to the government. The pro­
cess is repeated by the second manufacturer or the distributor when, in turn, a sale is made 
in the business cycle. VAT is charged on the total sales price, the seller self-reimburses from
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the proceeds, and only the difference is remitted to the government. When a final sale is 
made —  usually by a retailer to the ultimate consumer —  the tax may or may not be shown 
separately, for at this point the chain comes to an end.
While the retailer is entitled to a reimbursement for VAT previously paid, the purchaser, 
who in the capacity as the consumer of the item acquired, is not in the business of selling 
goods or services, must bear the full tax cost. Thus, the VAT cost is passed through each 
business operation until it is finally paid in the purchase price by the retail consumer. VAT is 
intended to be a tax passed on to the ultimate consumer, although the effect of the VAT rate 
on the price the market will bear may, in some cases, force a seller to reduce the profit 
margin. Thus, the producer may be forced to absorb some of the VAT.
Table 7
Comparison of Three Methods of Calculating 
Value-Added Tax Liability 
(10-percent value-added tax)
STAGE OF PRODUCTION
Firm A
Manufacturer
Firm B 
Wholesaler
Firm C 
Retailer
Total
Economy
ADDITION METHOD
Factor payments plus net 
profit
Wages $150 $300 $ 200 $ 650
Rent 50 100 20 170
Interest 25 75 20 120
Profit 25 25 10 60
Total 250 500 250 1,000
Value-added tax $ 25 $ 50 $ 25 $ 100
SUBTRACTION METHOD
Sales $350 $850 $1,100 $2,300
Purchases (100) (350) (850) (1,300)
Value added
(sales minus purchases) 250 500 250 1,000
Value-added tax $ 25 $ 50 $ 25 $ 100
CREDIT METHOD
Sales $350 $850 $1,100 $2,300
Tax on sales 35 85 110 230
Purchases 100 350 850 1,300
Tax on purchases (10) (35) (85)  (130)
Value-added tax (tax on 
sales less tax on purchases) $ 25 $ 50 $ 25 $ 100
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 
(Washington, D.C.: USTD, November 1984), 3:9.
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It should be noted that the pass-through of the VAT cost applies to all purchases made by 
a business, whether of goods or services. If an enterprise pays VAT on an electrical bill, on 
stationery supplies, or on legal and accounting fees, the enterprise may recover the amount 
on the subsequent collections of VAT made on its own billings. The system, therefore, 
depends heavily on adequate invoicing, which sets out VAT as a separate item until the 
final sale for ostensibly private consumption.
VAT Rates
The fewer the exceptions or modifications, the more easily the system operates. Never­
theless, all the systems presently operating in Europe do grant relief to certain types of 
sales, generally in one of three possible forms.
1. The sale is taxed at a reduced rate (multiple-rate system).
2. The sale is exempt.
3. The taxable base is reduced.
Multiple Rates
Permitting two or more rates of VAT within a single production chain may or may not 
decrease the total tax paid. If there is a standard rate of 3 percent and a reduced rate of 1 
percent, the total tax paid does not change as long as the standard rate is applied at the end 
of the chain. For instance, if an item is purchased for $100 in a transaction to which the 
reduced rate (1 percent) applies, one dollar of VAT is collected and remitted. If the item is 
thereafter sold for $400 in a transaction in which a standard rate (3 percent) applies, the 
normal twelve dollars is collected and the seller self-reimburses for the one dollar pre­
viously paid, remitting eleven dollars to the government. The effect in such a case is merely 
to shift forward the total collection of tax. If, however, the situation is reversed and the nor­
mal rate is applied to the $100 purchase (meaning that a VAT of three dollars is paid upon 
acquisition), and the reduced rate is applied to the $400 sale (meaning that only four dollars 
in VAT is collected upon the second transaction), then total VAT collected drops from 
twelve to four dollars. Thus, a reduced rate at the end of a chain will also reduce total VAT 
collected. (See Appendix A, exhibits 2 and 3.)
Exemptions
The system can operate more easily if exemptions are kept to a minimum, but in most 
countries using VAT many applications are placed outside the system. These include the 
following businesses and transactions: (1) very small, probably retail, enterprises with 
marginal annual turnovers; (2) financial transactions (life insurance, banking, security 
purchases, and sales); (3) medical and educational services; (4) charitable activities; (5) 
newspaper, periodical, and book sales; and (6) sales of agricultural products and food. 
While these enterprises are required to pay VAT on most of their purchases, they do not 
charge the tax on their sales. The primary result of the exemption, then, is that they cannot 
recoup VAT paid through charges for the tax on sales; VAT paid becomes a cost of doing busi­
ness, just like any other cost. Questions of pricing strategy and competition about how (or if) 
this cost is passed to the consumer then must be answered by the entity’s management.
If the exempt business sells mostly at retail, the inability to recover VAT may not be a d is­
advantage, because VAT is also not charged on the “ value added” by the exempt person or 
entity. When profit margins are sufficiently high, an exemption can even prove to be a com­
petitive advantage. While a small exempt retailer may purchase an item for $100 and pay 
the same 3 percent VAT as a larger taxable retailer, the small retailer’s price to a customer 
need not include VAT and thus can be less than the amount charged by the larger retailer. 
For instance, if the larger retailer’s resale price is $200, the charge is $206 (assuming a 3-
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percent VAT) to recover the three dollars paid earlier and remit the three dollars levied on 
profit to the government. The smaller exempt retailer can charge something less and 
perhaps still make the same profit (depending on operating costs) with a price that covers 
VAT costs on purchases but not VAT on the resale.
In some cases, activities that are normally exempt may wish to have the option of electing to 
be covered, especially if small profit margins do not give them any real advantage over their 
larger taxable competitors. Such elections are permitted for some activities in a number of 
European systems. Other activities, like farming, may be granted a reduced rate that does 
not affect prices as substantially as other rates but does permit the activity to recover VAT 
paid on purchases— if not from VAT collected on sales, then from the government by way of 
refunds. Such variants complicate the system, of course, but seem to be widespread.
Businesses that are exempt on certain lines of activity but taxable on others also present 
special problems, requiring purchases to be prorated between exempt and taxable sales so 
that VAT recovery is limited to those purchases that can be related to taxable sales.
When a person or entity is exempt and makes a sale to a taxable person (that is, a sale 
that is not at retail), the taxable purchaser, not being charged (directly, at least) for VAT, 
will not be reimbursed for that cost upon resale. Thus, if the price charged for an item by an 
exempt seller is $100, which in fact covered two dollars of VAT paid earlier in the chain, and the 
taxable purchaser in turn sold the item for $200 in a sale to which a 3-percent VAT applies, 
the latter collects six dollars and remits the entire amount to the government. As a result, 
total VAT paid is eight rather than six dollars —  the total tax paid in the normal case.
An exempt stage in the course of a business chain may have the effect, therefore, of 
increasing the total tax paid because the taxable purchaser from an exempt seller is not 
entitled to reimbursement for VAT that may have been paid on the item before it was 
acquired. That is, if an exempt seller is selling to the ultimate consumer, that seller may 
have a competitive advantage over a nonexempt seller of the same product; conversely, if 
that seller is selling to a nonexempt reseller who is not the ultimate consumer, the exempt 
seller suffers a competitive disadvantage. (See Appendix A, exhibit 4.)
Zero Rate
In some cases, the government may allow a refund or credit for prior VAT paid, even 
though a subsequent sale is exempt. Use of a zero rate is one method of overcoming the 
administrative problems involved in refunding or crediting taxes paid on purchases when 
the subsequent sale is exempt. For example, if export sales are exempted, that is of no great 
benefit to the exporter unless the taxes paid on purchases attributable to the export can be 
recovered. Rather than having two categories of exempt sales —  tax recoverable and tax 
nonrecoverable —  the zero rating (in essence, an exempt, tax-recoverable sale) has been 
devised. This way, all truly exempt sales will be in the nonrecoverable category.
For example, the 1984 Treasury study uses the example of an urban transit service to 
highlight the difference between zero-rating and exemption.68 If urban transit service was 
zero-rated, then no tax would be charged on the transit service fares. The transit system 
would receive credit or refund for the VAT paid on its purchases of equipment, motor fuel, 
supplies, electricity, and any other business-use items. If transit service is exempt, however, 
the system providing the service will not apply tax on the fares received, and it will not 
receive a credit or refund for tax paid on its various purchases.
Refunds and Credits
If a business is just commencing, or if it has heavy export or other exempt or zero-rated 
sales, it is possible for its collections of VAT on sales to be materially less than it paid on pur­
chases. In cases of this type, the government may refund the difference on a monthly or 
quarterly basis, or it may require the entity to carry forward the unreimbursed VAT against
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sales of later periods. In such a case, if sales by the entity do not incur sufficient VAT to offset 
VAT paid on purchases both currently and on a carryover basis, the unrecovered tax obvi­
ously becomes a cost to the enterprise. Generally speaking, the refund system is preferred to 
that requiring an enterprise to recover its VAT on a credit basis over an extended period of time.
Capital Goods
One interesting feature of VAT as it is usually applied is that purchases of capital goods 
are included within the system. Thus, manufacturers’ purchases of machinery and equip­
ment would generally be subject to the normal rate, which would be recovered currently by 
VAT collected on sales of manufactured goods. The consumption-type VAT is the Euro­
pean norm, permitting full current recovery of VAT on capital goods; however, some 
authorities argue that VAT on such items should not be recovered at all (gross product sys­
tem) or that VAT should be recovered only over the life of the asset on an annual pro rata 
basis (income system) .69 These last two systems of VAT have not been generally accepted, 
but most countries that have introduced VAT have provided transitional rules with respect 
to VAT paid on capital goods. Thus, in the first year of the new VAT system, only a partial 
recovery of VAT paid on capital goods is permitted; in the second year, an additional 
amount is allowed, and so forth, until all VAT paid on such items is reimbursed. This 
stepped phase-in to a full-consumption VAT can be crucial: Allowing full recovery of the 
tax immediately can seriously affect the capital goods market where VAT replaced a local 
sales tax that was not recoverable.
The impact on tax revenues is another reason for going to a full-consumption system 
gradually. Depending on the structure, under a sales tax the tax on capital goods may not 
be recovered, but under a VAT all of it would be recovered in the year of sale.70 The VAT on 
the sales resulting from use of the capital equipment, however, would be spread over 
many years.
Advantages of VAT
In concept, the tax itself has certain advantages and disadvantages. As in other areas of 
tax design, however, there are few bright-line pluses and minuses. Thus, what appears an 
advantage to proponents of a VAT may be a distinct disadvantage to opponents, and the 
following analysis of the pros and cons inevitably contains some duplication.
The proponents of a VAT frequently see its adoption as a means of encouraging savings 
and of raising the billions needed by the federal government to alleviate growing budget 
deficits. In doing so they often cite the following main advantages of a VAT.
Large Potential for Revenue
T hat a federal VAT has a tremendous potential for revenue is obvious. Transactional 
consumption provides a much greater base than any other federal tax system presently 
employed; its value base can be as large as the gross national product. The Treasury 
estimates —  even allowing for exemptions for vital necessities and for certain industries 
and groups —  that the projected 1988 VAT base would be about $2.4 trillion. Each percentage 
point of a VAT levied on this total would yield about $24 billion.71
Encouragement of Savings
VAT, being a consumption-based tax, would probably be perceived by most as being 
strongly pro-savings rather than being pro-consumption. Some commentators, however, 
have argued that VAT is relatively neutral in this regard. Since a VAT would probably be 
imposed on virtually all goods and services (whether oriented toward consumption or sav­
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ing), the VAT should raise the cost of saving in the same proportion that it raises the cost of 
consumption. In addition, a “ consumption V A T,” in which the cost of capital outlays is 
currently deducted from the tax base, would be tax-neutral in capital formation.
Thus, it is argued that VAT is essentially neutral toward the saving/consumption 
choice.72 However, since the present U .S. system has an apparently negative effect on sav­
ing, the VAT is relatively pro-savings, thereby creating a salutary effect that would make 
greater investment and a higher rate of economic growth possible.73 Nevertheless, the 
degree that saving would increase by substituting VAT for part of the income taxes is dif­
ficult to predict because that degree depends crucially on the elasticity of saving with re­
spect to the interest rate, a figure of debate among economists. Charles McLure, for one, 
feels positive: “ If savings elasticities are near the high end of the range generally agreed to 
be reasonable, a tax substitution of this type could significantly increase saving.” 74 
Neutrality of Application
VAT, being based on the selling price of products, does not favor capital-intensive oyer 
labor-intensive industries. The use of equity financing and debt financing does not affect 
the tax except as their elements are passed on in price. Present income-tax incentives 
would be nullified. The form of business organization does not affect the tax.
Encouragement of Efficient Resource Allocation
Some observers argue that business would allocate resources more efficiently if it were 
freed from the income tax system’s inducement for wasteful spending. A  VAT does not tax 
the business as such, but only the end product or service; consequently, all advantage 
under a VAT lies in reducing the total costs of the business, as reflected in the ultimate sell­
ing price. Thus, the imposition of a VAT can well lead to capital investment (for example, 
plant modernization) and consequently lower unit costs.
More Stable Revenues
In addition to the large potential for revenues, VAT is independent of profits and so it 
would also avoid the fluctuations of the present U .S. tax system, resulting in a more stable, 
predictable basis of federal receipts.
Ease of Administration
A  VAT, argue proponents, is relatively easy to administer. The self-policing aspects of 
the tax have proved to be sound in application. In an ideal VAT system with a single rate 
and few exemptions, the accounting procedures would be relatively simple.
Incentive for Exports
A major reason for the institution of the VAT in Europe was the desire to harmonize taxes 
on exports within the EEC. The use of exemptions or a zero rate on exports removes the tax 
inhibitions and inequities on trade and ensures a uniform tax burden in each jurisdiction. 
This same rationale extends beyond the E EC and encompasses all countries that are 
signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Under G ATT, all 
indirect taxes on export transactions may be rebated and are not treated as export sub­
sidies, which are prohibited.
Export products of a country that relies heavily on indirect taxes carry less of the overall 
tax burden and may have a competitive trade advantage. The imposition of a VAT does not 
itself create this advantage; but to the extent that it substitutes for another tax, such as an 
income tax not rebatable under GATT, VAT provides an incentive to export. (See Appendix 
A, exhibit 5.)
Since VAT is “ GATT-legal, ”  it would also carry the advantage of an approved (by treaty)
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export subsidy. The international difficulties posed to the United States from such export 
incentives as Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs) or Foreign Sales Cor­
porations (FSCs)would not exist.
Recapture of the Underground Economy
M any people in the public and private sectors are convinced that the present income tax 
system encourages taxpayers to avoid taxes by operating outside i t — that is, by creating an 
“ underground economy.” 75 Proponents of a VAT suggest that one of its major advantages 
would be to reintroduce much of that underground economy into the federal tax system. 
VAT can take a positive step in that direction, although underground activities such as bar­
tering can still continue. The experience of foreign countries indicates that the significance 
of increased participation is somewhat overstated (for example, bartering and “ moonlight­
ing”  transactions still go unreported).
Disadvantages of VAT
The opponents of a federal VAT believe the present U.S. tax system works remarkably 
well and would work even better if loopholes were closed, inequities were removed, and the 
base was broadened. On the other hand, opponents of VAT emphasize the following 
major deficiencies.
Too Much of a Revenue Potential
Fiscal 1984 corporate tax receipts approximated $56.9 billion.76 Based on Treasury 
estimates of $24 billion per percentage point of VAT imposed, the corporate tax system can 
be replaced with a VAT of 2.4 percent. Even adding to this figure the fiscal 1984 estimated 
individual tax receipts of $296.2 billion, both individual and corporate totals can be raised 
with a 14.7 percent VAT.
Perhaps the most illuminating caution about the VAT was made by a long-time advocate 
of it, Dan Throop Smith: “ If a VAT leads to excessive government spending which would 
not otherwise occur, the great revenue potential of VAT m ay be the best argument 
against it. ” 77
Lack of Counter-Cyclical Balance
The income tax is said to be a built-in stabilizer for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. In boom 
periods it drains off more revenue from the private sector, dampening an overheated 
economy; on the downswing, it has the reverse effect. The relatively inelastic VAT lacks 
this counter-cyclical aspect; and while it would not restrain a boom, it may contribute to 
the decline in consumption in a recession.
Burden on New or Marginal Enterprises
A VAT would require each business, regardless of its profitability, to include a proportionate 
share of the federal tax burden in its billings for goods or services. Thus, the new or marginal 
business may not be able to meet the price competition occasioned by a reduction of income 
taxes on profitable business and a replacement of tax through a VAT on all business.
Inflationary Effect on Prices
A VAT is inherently inflationary. It is an additional element of cost to be passed on to the 
consumer, and it thus increases the ultimate selling price. This cost-push principle makes 
the imposition of a VAT not without risk. According to some economists, the chain reaction, 
resulting from imposition of VAT, creates the possibility of an inflationary spiral.78
36
On the other hand, the Treasury proposals note that the experience of countries with a 
VAT confirms the view that it may generate a one-shot increase in the price level but not an 
annual inflationary spiral: “ There may be some secondary price increases because of wage 
payments and other business contracts that are indexed to the general price level, but these 
would be modest by comparison with the initial increase.” 79 The 1981 International M on­
etary Fund study relied on by the Treasury noted that in twenty-one of the thirty-one coun­
tries analyzed, the introduction of a VAT had no major impact on the price level. Out of the 
remaining ten, only one (Norway) had a rate of increase in the price level not explained by 
other economic factors. The IM F study concluded that the introduction of a VAT was not 
“ inherently”  inflationary.80
Also, certain factors can mitigate the inflationary impact of a VAT. If the tax is a replace­
ment for other taxes, the inflationary aspects may be minimal. This would also be true if 
governmental spending policy reduces the need for personal outlays, leaving a larger 
balance for normal consumption or savings. Also, a low rate of VAT would produce relatively 
little inflationary pressure; on the other hand, if the tax is substantial, both savings and 
consumption would drop (unless taxpayers, through increased production, are able to 
increase their total incomes to compensate for the tax).
Difficulties of Administration
The experience of foreign nations indicates that it is not as easy to administer a VAT as 
was once assumed. Nations with a VAT continue to have problems with compliance and 
collection; levels of VAT evasion appear to be comparable with levels of income tax evasion. 
In fact, some of the administrative problems are similar (for example, the difficulty of 
separating business from personal expenditures). The Treasury estimates that when fully 
phased in, the administration of a VAT would cost about $700 million per year and necessi­
tate the hiring of about 20,000 employees over three years, in addition to the staff presently 
needed to administer the income tax.81
If a VAT or a federal retail sales tax were combined with the various state sales taxes now 
in existence, they could be administered through a single authority, which would increase 
uniformity and decrease administrative problems.82 Of course, the states would have to 
agree to become part of such a national system, and such agreement would be far from cer­
tain. To date, no state has taken advantage of the opportunity to completely tie its income 
tax system to the federal income tax.
Lack of Incentive for Exports
The export subsidy advantage for VAT has been challenged repeatedly. VAT is not directly 
a cost item to a producer, who obtains no direct benefits from its remission. It is true, 
however, that a national VAT is not included in a foreign sales price, thus permitting an 
exporter to charge what may be considered a more competitive price abroad. To this extent, 
exempting export sales from VAT can improve an exporter’s ability to compete in a 
foreign market.
On the other hand, if the country of destination imposes a VAT, any advantage attribut­
able to tax relief is obviously neutralized. Imposing a VAT and then remitting it on exports 
cannot act as a subsidy. However, VAT imposed in lieu of an income tax, or of an income tax 
increase that would not be rebated, does shift overall tax costs from exported items. In this 
context, a VAT can be said to favor exports, although it is not an outright incentive. 
Regressive Nature of a VAT
As already noted, there is consensus that a relatively low rate of VAT would yield a high 
total of tax revenue. However, a prime concern is that this burden would be largely 
shouldered by lower income groups, who tend to consume a higher proportion of their 
income than the more wealthy. Thus, the tax would likely be regressive.
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To counter this argument, some VAT proponents, after giving consideration to the flow of 
government expenditures generated by a VAT, believe that the real incomes of the low- 
income groups may even be enhanced. When government expenditures, directly or indirectly, 
distribute proportionately greater benefits to low-income groups than their aggregate con­
tribution, the tax system employed should be considered progressive. Thus, family allowances, 
student grants, pensions, medical payments, and similar social benefits —  if liberalized 
through VAT financing— can free individuals from having to save for these important con­
tingencies, or at least having to subsidize their costs.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that regressiveness can be overcome by credits or 
refunds, although no country has employed such a system. On the other hand, exemptions 
for food, clothing, medicine, and other necessities are common under the Western European 
VAT systems; but these exemptions extend benefits beyond those needing relief and, like 
credits or refunds, add complexity.
Harming State and Local Revenue Sources
An important aspect of introducing a federal VAT or retail sales tax would be the effect on 
state retail-sales-tax systems. The 1984 Treasury study, however, notes the following: 
“ While the Federal government should be sensitive to the impact a national sales or value 
added tax would have on state and local governments, it is not clear that this should pre­
clude Federal adoption of such a tax. ” 83
Presumably, VAT can be administered as a separate system more easily than the mul­
titude of state retail-sales-tax systems can, but it is also clear that the existence of two such 
tax systems side by side is undesirable. The Treasury states: “ [I]t would be adminis­
tratively difficult to piggyback state retail sales taxes on a Federal value-added tax.” 84 
Ideally, the federal government can collect all VAT or retail sales taxes and remit a pre­
determined portion to each state. In fact, a VAT system might permit the federal govern­
ment to remit revenue to the states where value was in fact added, rather than simply to the 
states where the final retail sale took place, as would be the case under the traditional sales 
tax setup. Obviously, such a single system would require a nationwide rate if either a VAT 
system or a federal retail-sales-tax system was to be adopted.85 Although this appears to 
encroach upon the right of the states to determine tax rates locally, the provision for 
revenue sharing can have a positive long-term effect. The likely approach, then, would be 
to harmonize transaction taxes as levied by the various states and thus to remove some of 
the inequities existing among the various states that continue to affect interstate com­
merce. The point would doubtless be made that if Europe can harmonize its tax systems 
within the EEC, the United States should be able to accomplish the same sort of federal- 
state harmonization, with considerable overall benefit to business. As a politically practical 
matter, however, it may never be possible to obtain the acceptance of such an arrangement 
by fifty separate states.
Comparison of VAT With Other Taxes
If the U.S. government were to impose a VAT, the tax would probably be as a partial sub­
stitute for other federal taxes, specifically the corporate or individual income tax. Thus 
VAT may be used as a replacement for or as a supplement to federal taxes presently in 
place.
VAT Compared With the Federal Corporate Income Tax
Economists disagree about the extent to which the corporate income tax is absorbed by 
business, reducing the after-tax rate of return on labor and investment, or is merely passed 
on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. This uncertainty makes it very difficult to
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compare the effects of the corporate income tax with those of a VAT, which would clearly be 
reflected in prices. Although it is difficult to be certain of the extent of the difference, the 
comparatively low rate of VAT (contrasted with the corporate income tax rate) provides 
some likelihood that VAT would be passed on to the consumer to a greater extent than present 
income taxes on business are now.
If this were the case, such an effect would have both advantages and disadvantages. On 
the one hand, substitution of a VAT for income taxes would increase the after-tax rate of 
return, thereby stimulating savings and investments. On the other hand, the VAT would be 
more regressive than the corporate income tax, and the increase in consumer prices would 
have some inflationary effect.
Another point of comparison involves the issue of neutrality. Some economists consider 
VAT a more neutral tax th a n  income tax.86 There are, however, problems with this posi­
tion. In recognition of political realities, Congress would probably produce a U .S. VAT sys­
tem with exemptions and other complexities, or gradually add such complexities over 
time, thereby eliminating much of the neutrality of the tax. Insofar as the VAT does remain 
neutral, it would be so in the sense of applying equally to all business enterprises. The present 
tax system has less effect on small or marginally profitable companies because of differences 
in the tax rates. The introduction of a VAT may increase the burden on smaller and 
marginal firms —  an effect that may even hasten the collapse of marginally profitable 
enterprises. Thus, in comparison with today’s corporate system, the VAT would not be 
completely neutral; compared with the present income tax, it would result in a bias favor­
ing larger, more profitable businesses.
VAT Compared With the Federal Individual Income Tax
O f all taxes levied by the federal government, the individual income tax yields the 
greatest revenue. Its progressivity and successful self-assessment procedure have been 
matters of pride to many Americans; the likelihood of it ever being completely replaced by a VAT 
is practically nil. Nor is it likely that VAT would be used to reduce the personal income tax 
rates because of its apparently regressive nature, certainly when compared with the progres­
sive individual-income-tax rate structure. Although VAT may be made less regressive by 
special rates, credits, exemptions, and rebates (and probably would have to be if it is intro­
duced in the United States), such features would make it more complex administratively.
A VAT used as even a partial substitute for the federal individual-income-tax system 
appears, therefore, to be politically unlikely. If VAT were to be adopted because of its favor­
able effects on business, certain features of the present income tax system may then be sub­
ject to modification in order to improve the system’s progressivity.
Some economists also maintain that high income taxes cause resources to shift outside 
the economic system. They argue that, as income taxes increase, present consumption 
replaces saving and leisure time replaces work.87 Such a shift results in lower production 
and a lower standard of living. The VAT, on the other hand, would encourge saving and dis­
courage present consumption.
Retail Sales Tax
Forty-five of the states, the District of Columbia, and many local governments have a 
retail sales tax, a single-stage tax that applies on all sales to final consumers, not just those 
made by reta ilers. A  re ta il sales tax is levied on all final or retail sales of goods and services 
except those that are exempt from tax.88 Most of the advantages and disadvantages 
claimed for a VAT would also apply to a retail sales tax, and thus only the major differences 
are highlighted.
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Potential Revenue
A  major advantage of a national retail sales tax would be its sizeable potential revenue. 
For fiscal year 1984, the Congressional Research Service estimates that a retail sales tax 
would yield between $8.1 billion and $18.2 billion per 1 percent of tax, depending on the com­
prehensiveness of the sales tax base.89 Using the Treasury estimates of $3,127 trillion of per­
sonal consumption expenditures for 1988, a 1-percent retail sales tax would yield between $10.9 
and $24.7 billion, as compared with $24 billion for a 1-percent VAT. (See Appendix B.) 
Other Advantages and Disadvantages
Another advantage of the retail sales tax is its relative ease of administration. The retail 
sales tax is not in theory simpler than a VAT, but it is imposed only on the last transaction, 
thereby reducing administrative costs and the number of businesses required to file returns.
Furthermore, the retail sales tax has the advantage of familiarity; the U .S. public knows 
how a retail sales tax operates and copes daily with its administrative burdens. A  1983 
Gallup Poll survey, contracted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
asked this question: “ If the federal government had to raise taxes substantially, which 
would be a better way to do it?” The respondents preferred a sales tax with a food exemp­
tion by more than a two-to-one margin instead of an increase in the personal income 
tax.
Table 8
Responses to the Question:
“If the Federal Government Had to Raise Taxes Substantially, 
Which Would Be the Better Way to Do It?”
(in percentages)
Increasing Individual 
Income Taxes
A New National Sales Tax 
on All Purchases
Other Than Food Don’t Know
Total Public Asked 24 52 25
Male 25 53 22
Female 23 51 27
Northeast 31 40 29
North-Central 21 58 21
South 21 55 24
West 24 52 25
Non metro 21 57 22
Metro—50,000 and over
Fringe 27 50 23
Central city 25 46 30
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Changing Public Attitudes on Governments 
and Taxes. (Washington, D.C.:. ACIR, 1983), 9.
VAT Compared With the Retail Sales Tax
Like a broad-based VAT, a retail sales tax that exempts all production inputs, including 
capital goods, would be relatively neutral with respect to both consumption and produc­
tion decisions. Most states do not fully exclude capital equipment and other business
40
purchases from the scope of the retail sales tax, unlike the exclusions under a VAT. 
Although all states exclude sales for resale, including sales of goods that become physical 
ingredients or component parts of goods produced by the purchaser, the states have more 
limited exclusions for fuel, industrial machinery, farm machinery and equipment, office 
supplies and equipment, and other business purchases not consumed directly in the pro­
duction process. In practice, most states make no serious effort to exclude all purchases for 
business purposes from their retail sales taxes. About 20 percent of state retail-sales-tax 
revenue comes from taxing producers’ goods.
A  comprehensive federal sales tax would offer the states an opportunity to “ piggyback” 
the state taxes on the federal base. States would enjoy the advantage of the broadly defined 
federal base, but would be free to set their own state tax rates, depending on state fiscal 
needs. This would avoid any intergovernmental disputes over the proper amount of sales 
tax revenue to be shared with the states. Federal-state piggybacking in this area would be 
easier to apply under a federal retail-sales-tax than under a federal VAT. The Treasury 
notes: “ Either tax, retail sales or value added, would be viewed by state and local govern­
ment officials as encroaching on the fiscal territory of the states and would be criticized as 
such, though the value added tax might be more acceptable because of its cosmetic 
differences.” 90
Since a federal retail sales tax is collected only at the end of a chain of transactions, the 
probability of successful evasion increases. A  VAT is collected at every stage and thus has a 
self-enforcing aspect lacking in a retail sales tax. The self-enforcing aspects of a VAT, 
however, appear to be overstated. M any countries find it necessary to employ a com­
prehensive program of matching the VAT remitted by the seller with claims for credit by 
the purchaser —  a matching program similar to the one currently used in the United States 
for dividend and interest reporting. Furthermore, with the VAT there is a problem of 
fraudulent invoices to claim credit for nonexistent purchases.
Several less important differences also exist. A  VAT tends to cover the service sector of 
the economy more broadly than the retail sales tax. A  VAT is simpler in operation for com­
mercial customers: It does not require resale certificates or exemption certificates, for 
example. The VAT is completely rebated on exports, whereas a portion of the retail sales 
tax (on supplies, for example) may not be rebated. Finally, because retail sales taxes have 
until now been reserved for state and local jurisdictions, the adoption of a federal retail 
sales tax may create political problems, but the adoption of a VAT may also avoid some 
of them.
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Chapter 6
CHANGES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Aside from major structural shifts to a comprehensive income tax or a consumption tax 
(periodic or transactional), a third alternative for improving saving is to make changes to 
the current tax system that discourage consumption, encourage saving, or do both. This 
approach is summed up in a sentence by Senator David L. Boren: “ Instead of confusing this 
[savings] issue by injecting a debate about a major shift in the tax structure, an evolutionary 
change in the present system may well be preferable.”91 Changes fall into several categories. 
One method would be to add saving incentives to the system; another would be to increase 
provisions that are already pro-savings. Finally, reducing deductions, exclusions, and so 
forth, that are anti-savings would encourage saving relatively more than the current sys­
tem does.
Appendix C includes a list of major revenue items in the present system, and serves as a 
possible road map to those provisions which, because of the potential dollar effect, can be 
viewed as a relatively efficient way to provide saving and investment incentives. Because 
the Congressional Budget Office prepares periodic estimates of the ongoing projected 
amounts of “ tax expenditures,” it is possible to be relatively confident about the revenue 
impact of specific potential changes. That impact is reflected in Appendix C, based on the 
last such CBO study (issued in October 1983 for the government’s fiscal years 1983-1988).
However, changes in the tax system, whose revenue effects have traditionally been 
measured on a static basis, create serious questions concerning equity, simplicity, and 
economic side effects. Appendix C presents one set of views about how pro- or anti-savings 
some of these changes may be, how broadly taxpayers can be affected, and the degree to 
which administrative or statutory simplicity can be introduced from such changes. These 
are, however, highly subjective views, any of which may provoke disagreement. (Thus, 
readers of this study are cordially invited to substitute their own opinions on these subjects 
and, effectively, produce their own tables as a guide for future changes to our existing 
income tax system.)
Yet another incentive for saving is a savings tax credit, which would be similar in inten­
tion and computation to the investment tax credit, but would be used for personal savings 
rather than for business investment. Another possibility is to exclude saved income from 
taxation until consumed; such a provision would effectively move the current system 
toward a consumed-income tax. Finally, a schedular system may be instituted that would 
tax saved income at a lower rate than consumed income. All of these proposals certainly 
would encourage saving more than consumption.
Still another way to encourage saving within the present system would be to increase 
provisions that are already pro-savings. The accelerated cost recovery system can be 
further accelerated and investment tax credits increased. Additional incentives can be pro­
vided for research and development while rates are reduced further on the first $100,000 of 
corporate income (or the $100,000-level can be raised).
On the personal side, pro-savings measures may include the provision of added preferen­
tial treatment for capital gains through reduction of rates or of holding periods, or of both.
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Deductible contributions to IRAs and Keogh plans can be increased, along with interest and 
dividend exclusions; interest and dividends can even be wholly excluded (full exclusion of 
dividends would serve to eliminate the problem of double taxation). Reduction or elimina­
tion of estate and gift taxes is yet another possibility. Finally, current provisions for indexa­
tion can be increased. All these changes would tend to increase personal savings. (Non-supply- 
side economists would be quick to argue that the increase would come at possibly an unac­
ceptable cost to the federal fisc.)
Finally, deductions, deferrals, and exclusions that produce an anti-savings effect may be 
reduced or eliminated. Perhaps the most significant item to modify is the personal interest 
deduction. The interest deduction tends to promote consumption, encouraging the flow of 
funds into homes and durable goods rather than into financial assets. Furthermore, if the 
interest deduction is not reduced or eliminated along with other changes, taxpayers may 
simply borrow to increase their savings and, hence, receive double deductions.
M aking changes to the current system is certainly the alternative that is easiest to imple­
ment administratively. The Congressional Budget Office takes this position: “ The pro­
posals for interest exclusion, reducing the maximum rate on investment income, and 
disallowing the interest deduction would require little or no change in existing pro­
cedures.” 92 These proposals would probably succeed in increasing funds available for capi­
tal formation, although the extent of such an increase cannot be predicted with certainty. 
Hence, changing the current system is advantageous mainly because it would encourage 
current savings and would be relatively easy to accomplish.
As noted previously, if the changes simply involve new saving incentives without a con­
current change in the interest-deduction provisions, taxpayers may simply borrow to 
invest. The tax system will encourage both borrowing and investing and have little effect on 
total capital formation.93 Furthermore, if the incentives are only for certain forms of 
savings, they may simply shift savings from other instruments to the tax-favored forms. In 
addition, the raising of exclusions for savings may only help high-bracket taxpayers, who 
can afford to save more than the current limit.
Although these changes would be easiest to accomplish administratively, the problem of 
hurting political constituencies would not disappear. Tax Notes points out just one exam­
ple: “ The subsidy [the home interest and real estate tax deduction] provides has been 
widely incorporated into prices and investment decisions throughout the economy and 
could not be eliminated without causing significant short term losses and economic dis­
location.” 94 Repealing such deductions would be difficult at best, and without repeal, the 
creation of an incentive to borrow to invest looms large. Instituting new saving incentives 
may also be difficult politically because taxpayers will perceive them to be inequitable to 
those who cannot afford to save. Finally, the revised system would still provide economic 
incentives (and, hence, disincentives) for certain investments and would require change as 
soon as promoting saving was no longer the primary goal.
The alternative of changing the current tax system has its own weaknesses, as do the 
others. However, it would probably not cause as large an economic disruption as those 
alternatives that suggest changing everything. Furthermore, as noted previously, other 
alternatives are inherently revolutionary and carry many administrative problems, as well 
as much uncertainty about their expected effects on saving and investment. In this sense, 
changing the current system is the alternative that gives relatively more certain predic­
tions about effects on saving and investment, and the means that would encourage such 
activity most quickly.
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Appendix A
Value-Added Tax Examples
Exhibit 1
Income-Tax-Base Calculation
Sales, net of returns and allowances 
Cost of goods sold
Beginning Inventory 
Purchases 
Direct labor 
Supplies, etc.
$ 300,000 2 
200,000 1 
400,000 2 
100,000 1
$1,000,0001
Total 1,000,000
Ending Inventory (400,000)2 600,000
Gross profit 
Salaries 
Services, etc. 
Supplies, etc. 
Rent
Depreciation 
Interest and taxes 
Other deductions
100,0002
50,000 1 
50,000 1 
40,000 2 
30,000 2 
20,000 2 
10,000 2
400,000
(300,000)
Net profit from operations
Royalties
100,000 
50,000 2
Income tax base $ 150,000
Income tax due at 46% $ 69,000
1Accounts used in determining VAT liability under either the invoice or subtraction method. 
2Accounts used in determining VAT liability under the addition method.
45
Ex
hi
bi
t 
2
R
ed
uc
ed
 R
at
e 
at
 W
ho
le
sa
le
 L
ev
el
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
)
Pu
rc
ha
se
s 
Va
lu
e 
A
dd
ed
 
Sa
le
s 
Pr
ic
e 
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
VA
T 
Pa
ym
en
t t
o 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
by
 S
el
le
r 
by
 S
el
le
r 
(C
ol
um
n 
1 p
lu
s 
2)
 (
C
ol
um
n 
3 
tim
es
 V
AT
 R
at
e)
 
VA
T 
C
re
di
t 
by
 S
el
le
r (
C
ol
um
n 
4 
m
in
us
 5
)
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r s
el
ls
 to
 w
ho
le
sa
le
r 
—
 
$3
00
 
$3
00
 
$ 
30
a 
(—
) 
$3
0
W
ho
le
sa
le
r s
el
ls
 to
 re
ta
ile
r 
$3
00
 
20
0 
50
0 
45
b 
($
30
) 
15
R
et
ai
le
r s
el
ls
 to
 c
on
su
m
er
 
50
0 
10
0 
60
0 
60
a 
(4
5)
 
15
To
ta
l V
al
ue
-A
dd
ed
 T
ax
 C
ol
le
ct
io
n 
$6
0
aV
al
ue
-A
dd
ed
 R
at
e 
at
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t.
bR
ed
uc
ed
 V
al
ue
-A
dd
ed
 R
at
e 
at
 9
 p
er
ce
nt
.
46
Ex
hi
bi
t 
3
R
ed
uc
ed
 R
at
e 
at
 R
et
ai
l L
ev
el
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
)
Pu
rc
ha
se
s 
Va
lue
 A
dd
ed
 
Sa
le
s 
Pr
ice
 
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
VA
T 
Pa
ym
en
t t
o 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
by
 S
el
le
r 
by
 S
el
le
r 
(C
ol
um
n 
1 p
lu
s 
2)
 (
C
ol
um
n 
3 
tim
es
 V
AT
 R
at
e)
 
VA
T 
C
re
di
t 
by
 S
el
le
r (
C
ol
um
n 
4 
m
in
us
 5
)
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r s
el
ls 
to
 w
ho
le
sa
le
r 
—
 
$3
00
 
$3
00
 
$ 
30
a 
(—
) 
$3
0
W
ho
le
sa
le
r s
el
ls
 to
 r
et
ai
le
r 
$3
00
 
20
0 
50
0 
50
a 
($
30
) 
20
R
et
ai
le
r s
el
ls
 to
 c
on
su
m
er
 
50
0 
10
0 
60
0 
54
b 
(5
0)
 
4
To
ta
l V
al
ue
-A
dd
ed
 T
ax
 C
ol
le
ct
io
n 
$5
4
aV
al
ue
-A
dd
ed
 R
at
e 
at
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t.
bR
ed
uc
ed
 V
al
ue
-A
dd
ed
 R
at
e 
at
 9
 p
er
ce
nt
.
47
Manufacturer sells to wholesaler
Exhibit 4
Effects of an Exempt Sale at 
Wholesale and Retail Levels
All Sales Taxable Exempt Wholesaler Exempt Retailer
Sales price $100
VAT at 10% ___10_
Total cost 110
Wholesaler sells to retailer
Total cost 110
Prepaid VAT ( 10)
Value added 100
Sales price  200
VAT at 10% 20
Total cost 220
$100
10
110
$100
1 0
110
110
100
210
210
110 
( 10)
100
200
20
220
Retailer sells to consumer
Total cost 220
Prepaid VAT ( 20)
Value added 200
Sales price 400
VAT at 10% 40
210
200
410
41
220
200
420
Total cost $440 $451 $420
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Exhibit 5
Comparison of Export Sales (VAT Versus Non-VAT) Countries
Exporter of the United States Exporter of a VAT Country
Selling price to customer in Morocco 
Manufacturing cost 
Insurance and freight 
Duty (10% ad valorem)
Value-added tax paid out 
Tax eliminated on export
$150.00 $150.00
100.00 100.00
3.00 3.00
10.30 10.30
— 10.00
— (10.00)
Total expense 113.30 113.30
Net profit before tax 36.70 36.70
Income tax (at 46%) 16.88 14.68 (at 40%)
Net profit after tax $ 19.82 $ 22.02
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Appendix B
Estimated Revenue From a National Sales Tax
Estimated Revenue Yield
Base
Percentage 
of Personal 
Consumption
Per 1 % Tax ($ in billions)
Source Type
Fiscal Year 
1983
Fiscal Year 
1984
Fiscal Year 
1988
Broad 79.1% $16.7 $18.2 $24.7
McLure
Narrow 45.4 9.6 10.5 14.2
Broad 75 15.8 17.3 23.4
Musgraves
Narrow 35 7.4 8.1 10.9
Source: CRS computations are based on tax studies (McLure and the Musgraves) and aggregate personal consumption 
figures (Department of Commerce and DRI).
In estimating revenues that can be generated by a broad or narrow retail-sales-tax base, James Bickley in 
National Sales Tax: Selected Policy Issues used two different studies: one by Professor Charles E. McLure, and the 
other by Professors Richard and Peggy Musgrave. McLure used his own judgment in determining which items to 
exclude in order to establish a consumption tax base. His broad-based and narrow-based consumption taxes 
would be levied on 79.1 percent and 45.4 percent of personal consumption expenditures, respectively. The 
Musgraves used state-sales-tax exclusions in computing their base. Their broad base (encompassing 75 percent 
of consumer expenditures) excluded items “generally” excluded from state sales taxation; their narrow base (35 
percent of consumer expenditures) excluded items “frequently” and “ generally” excluded from state sales taxation.
Personal consumption expenditures for fiscal year 1983 were $2,112 billion; for fiscal year 1984, they were an 
estimated $2,304.7 billion. Thus, per 1 -percent of tax, a retail sales tax derived from McLure’s bases would have 
yielded $16.7 billion (1 percent X 79.1 percent X $2,112 billion) with a broad base, and $9.6 billion with a narrow 
base for fiscal year 1983. Similar estimates can be generated for fiscal year 1984 and for the Musgraves’ data. If 
nothing else, the table demonstrates the larger revenue capacity of a retail sales tax.
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Appendix C
Tax Expenditure Items — Effect on Savings
With the exception of the “ Pro-savings" column, each attribute below was evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 
means the attribute exists to the least degree, and 3 means the attribute exists to the greatest degree.
The “ Pro-savings” column uses a scale of - 3  to +3 : zero is neutral, negative numbers are anti-savings, and 
positive numbers are pro-savings.
(Note: See the third paragraph on page 42 about the subjective nature of much of this material.)
BUSINESS ITEMS
Pro­
savings a
Scope of 
Taxpayers 
Affected
Revenue 
Impactb
Adminis­
trative and 
Statutory 
Simplicity
Research and development deductions
and credits 3 1 2 2
Industrial-development-bonds interest 
exclusion (see below for general- 
purpose bonds) 3 1 2  1
Accelerated depreciation 3 3 3 1
Investment tax credit 3 3 3 1
Reduced rates on first $100,000 of
corporate income 3 3 2 3
Capital-gains lower rate
(also included below) 3 3 2 3
Indexation (also included below)0 3 3 — 1
INDIVIDUAL AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT ITEMS
Itemized deductions
Medical expenses 0 3 2 2
State and local taxes other than
real estate credits 0 3 3 2
Real estate taxes - 3 3 3 3
Mortgage interest - 3 3 3 3
Consumer interest - 3 3 3 3
Charitable contributions 0 3 2-3 1
Deferrals and exclusions
Deferral of gain on sale of residence - 2 e 2-3 2 2
Exemption of $125,000 gain on sale of
residence 1e 2 1 3
Exclusion of life-insurance-policy earnings 3 3 2 3
Medical care premiums paid by employer -1 3 3 2
Social security benefits 0 3 3 3
Workmen’s compensation benefits 0 2 2 2
Private-pension-plan contributions 3 3 3 1
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Pro-
savingsa
Group-term life insurance 3
Unemployment insurance benefits 0
Credits and other
Capital gain-lower rate 3
Indexation of rates d 3
Investment tax credit 3
FMV-basis step-up at date of death 3
Child-care credit 0
IRA contribution 3
Second-working-spouse deduction 0
OTHER ITEMS
Exclusion of interest — state and local 
general-purpose bonds - 3
Zero bracket am ountc 0
Exemptionsc 0
Scope of 
Taxpayers 
Affected
Revenue 
Impactb
Adminis­
trative and 
Statutory 
Simplicity
3 2 3
2 2 3
3 3 1
3 — 1
3 2 1
3 2 3
2 1 2
3 2 2
2 2 3
3 3 2
3 2-3 3
3 2-3 3
Notes:
aln the context used in this analysis, “ Pro-savings” means the level of encouragement of individuals’ investment in private 
sector financial assets and encouragement of business retention of income. “ Pro-savings” as used here includes both 
increases in overall level of national saving and shifts within the components of national saving to more productive 
forms of investment.
bRevenue impact is based on the following figures.
Evaluation Annual Tax Expenditure* (current year or projected future year)
1 $ 1-2 billion
2 2 + -1 0  billion
3 10 + billion
*Source: Tax Expenditures: Current Issues and Five-Year Budget Projections for Fiscal Years 1984-1988 
(Washington, D.C.: CBO, October 1983).
cNot included in the official listings of tax expenditure items.
d Indexation of income tax rates for individuals started for tax years beginning in 1985.
eThe exclusion of up to $125,000 of gain from the sale of a principal residence by taxpayers aged 55 years or older is 
believed to work in tandem with the tax-free rollover rules. Under current law, the exclusion is an incentive for the 
taxpayer to retain sales proceeds rather than reinvest in a more costly replacement home to gain the deferral benefit. 
The exclusion, therefore, encourages investment in more productive forms.
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